

21 Feb 1706
Hist. of Netherlands A vol. 3. p. 1. Janeway

MEMORIAL

DISPERSED IN

HOLLAND,

BY

An Emissary of FRANCE.

Containing Overtures towards a General Peace.

WITH AN

ANSWER

TO IT.

Done out of French.

LONDON,

Printed, and Sold by B. Bragg, at the Raven in Pater-noster-row, against Ivy-lane, 1706.

Price One Shilling.

ARACAJU

CE 222 E 1931 G



PASTORAL

История

J. I. O. T.

M. L. BURGESS

100703

With thanks and best regards,
John A. S. 112113

To the Honourable
Sir E. M. Bar.

SIR,

Peace is so desirable in itself, that I am not at all surprized that you should appear so inquisitive after the Truth of the various Reports spread by the News Papers throughout the Kingdom, of some Negotiations of Peace. I have done my utmost to inform my self of this affair, that I might gratifie your Curiosity; and the following Memorial and Answer being come to my hands, I transmit them to you, as the most Authentick Account I am able to give you of the Proposals made on the part of France towards Peace. You may perhaps have heard of some others, but I think they do not deserve to be taken notice of; and I do not see that they have esteem'd them beyond Sea worthy of an Answer. This Memorial is of another nature, and the Author of the Answer intimates, in his short

The Epistle Dedicatory.

Advertisement to the Reader, that it was drawn by order of the French Court; that the Emissaries of France in Holland spoke conformable thereunto, and that it wrought some impression upon People. When you have perused it, and carefully examin'd the Publick Transactions, I dare say you will agree with the Author of the Answer, and this will serve you as a Key to understand the true Reason of several Steps, which otherwise are altogether unaccountable. I cannot tell you who is the Author of the Answer; but from his affection to the House of Austria, which sometimes carries him a little too far, and some harsh Expressions in the Stile, I conclude that he is not Master of the French Language, and that he must be a Minister of the Emperor. He seems so well acquainted with the Affairs of Europe, and talks so positively in that respect, that I think my Conjecture well grounded, when I say, that he is employ'd in the service of that Prince.

Ad-

ADVERTISEMENT
TO THE
READER.

The following Memorial was communicated to me about five months ago, when it was suppos'd that the same had been presented to the States General of the United Provinces ; but I consider'd it at first as one of the Flying Papers, which the French are us'd to spread abroad to dazzle the common People ; and I could not perswade my self that it was written by the approbation of their Court, to be presented to persons, whose Penetration, Wisdom and Prudence they ought to esteem. I have been undeceiv'd since that time in that respect, and satisfy'd that France own'd it, being inform'd that her Emissaries have

Advertisement to the Reader.

have spoken conformable thereunto in Holland, and that their suggestions made some impression. This has obliged me to answer the said Memorial, knowing very well how much the Publick is concern'd to stand on their Guard, that they may not be surprized and deluded by the Artifices and Snares expressed in this Paper. I have not seen the 3 preceding Memorials, which are referr'd to in this, and whereof this is but a continuation; but as they are but a Preface or Introduction to this Project, (if there were any before) I hope this Answer will be sufficient for all, and that the Candid Reader will take kindly what I have said in view of a just, safe and honourable Peace, which may settle the Tranquility of Europe upon a lasting foundation.

M E.

MEMORIAL.

ANSWER.

A. **T**hey, who are so full of Prejudices, or so much biassed by their private interests, as to think that no safe Peace can be made with France, unless it be brought low and reduced to much narrower Bounds, cannot bear with any moderate Overtures in its favour.

ry to settle a just, safe and lasting Peace: Men will be no more deceived by those patch'd up Peaces, which within these last fifty years, have only served to make the Ruptures of France more frequent, and more pernicious to her Neighbours: More is required to assert the Liberty of Europe, and the Independency of Soveraigns.

B. They pretend that things are not yet come to maturity, to talk of a Peace, and they alledge several fine Reasons to justify their Prejudices, or their Passions in that respect.

by a Truce, or by a Negotiation of Peace; whilst France will make use of that Interval, to settle herself more and more in the possession of the Spanish Monarchy, and to disunite, if it be possible, some of the High Allies by some particular Offers; being it is the only means left her to retake the Superiority of Arms, and to make herself the Absolute Disposer of the Conditions of Peace: One may know her by her steps.

C. If France shews effectually some favourable dispositions, to treat of a Peace upon such conditions as may be advantageous to the High Allies, they'll maintain that it is only in order to deceive them, and betake herself afterwards to her pretended vast designs for an Universal Monarchy.

not blame so just a distrust, without blaming her own Conduct.

A. **T**he prepossession which arises from those Prejudices and private Interests, is a conviction too well grounded upon Reason and Experience, not to carry away the whole strength of the Judgment. Those moderate Overtures, which shall be seen hereafter, promise nothing less than what is necessary to settle a just, safe and lasting Peace: Men will be no more deceived by those patch'd up Peaces, which within these last fifty years, have only served to make the Ruptures of France more frequent, and more pernicious to her Neighbours: More is required to assert the Liberty of Europe, and the Independency of Soveraigns.

B. That maturity ought to consist in the safety of Negotiation, which we don't find here. The Author mentions only some general, and conditional Overtures, and such as tend only to deceive the High Allies, either

C. If the High Allies stand upon their Guard against the Artifices of France, nobody ought to be surprized at it: The Remembrance of the Conferences and Negotiations of all the preceding Peaces are still fresh; 'tis the same way, the same illusions, and the same snares. No body can be any more deceived by them: France cannot blame so just a distrust, without blaming her own Conduct.

D. That

2 MEMORIAL.

D. That the High Allies cannot be sure of any true Safety in contracting a Peace with her, and that therefore they ought to continue the War, till France be humbled and weakened in such a manner, that they may easily bring her to the Treaties of Munster and the Pyrenees, and even lower, to have nothing to fear from her for the time to come; that it is the only way of restoring the Ballance and Tranquility of Europe.

what a happiness would it be for all Christendom in general, and even for France, if the Most Christian King, out of a Prudent Forecast, or rather out of a motive of Conscience, wou'd reduce himself to those two Treaties; and how gladly wou'd the High Allies overlook the great advantages which France got by them; tho they have been so many steps for all the Invasions, whereby she has continued to aggrandize herself by the oppression of her Neighbours.

E. The Prejudices of those Gentlemen are so strong, that they don't consider that the pretended depression of France (after she has exhausted and weakened herself, to keep up the War with reputation) would render that Ballance very difficult, which they think to be so necessary for the general liberty of Europe, and the Independency of Sovereigns, at least with respect to Germany and Italy. To be convinced of it, one needs only consider the situation wherein Europe wou'd find itself, supposing that France was overcome and depressed to such a degree as those Gentlemen desire it.

ANSWER.

D. We challenge all Humane Prudence to find out any other way that may stop the Ambition of France, than to confine her to the Treaties of Munster and of the Pyrenees, which are the ground of all those that were made since; in order to restore such a Ballance, which is so necessary for the Repose and Liberty of Europe: But France may, if she pleases, prevent the continuation of the War, and that humiliation, if

it be true that she fears it: For,

E. The word Prejudice is taken here for an ill grounded proposition: But not to dispute about words, one may easily see by what follows, that it subsists in the whole strength of a well grounded Judgment. That pretended depression of France is but an illusion, which is destroyed by a contrary experience of her Forces, and Elevation within these last fifty years. France was not less exhausted in the two last Wars, she kept then as formidable Land and Sea Armies as she does now, and she had not then all the Treasures and Forces of the Spanish Monarchy at her disposal.

Ne-

MEMORIAL. ANSWER. 3.

Nevertheless, a Treaty was no sooner signed, but instead of disarming, as those with whom she was in War were to do, she began to insult all her Neighbours, and to make them feel, in the midst of a Peace, the most dismal effects of War. Afterwards, what might we not say here of her Ruptures and Invasions, which have so nearly followed those unhappy Treaties, and which she improved to her own Advantage so many different ways. The Question is not therefore about *Overcoming or Weakning France*, but about reducing her to a System, which may be advantageous to her, such as that whereunto the two aforesaid Treaties will confine her, and wherein all *Europe* in general, and the High Allies in particular, may likewise find their Repose and Safety. But if that Crown has been able to keep up itself with so much Glory, ever since its first Establishment, in all Domestick and Foreign Wars, which it was exposed to till the Reign of *Charles VIII.* that it never ceased since that time to aggrandize itself, till it attained to the Condition which the two before-mentioned Treaties gave her; and if at last that Condition did but prompt it to disturb the Repose of *Europe*, by continual Insults and Invasions, it is certain that the least that can be done, is to reduce it to those Treaties, if it be humanely possible.

F. It is evident that in such a case she would be indispensably obliged to yield, not only all her Rights and Pretensions to the Spanish Monarchy; but that it would be perhaps required of her, that she should give up all her Conquests and Acquisitions since the Peace of Munster and the Pyrenees; which comprehends a great many States, which would naturally fall to the House of Austria, the Power whereof would be thereby excessively increased, and attended with the advantages which commonly follow a good fortune, and with the extended Rights which are ascribed to the Emperor, and which the Court of Vienna would not fail to make use of in

F. In order to undermine all the frivolous Consequences which the Author builds upon the false supposition of the depression of France, and elevation of the House of Austria, as a consequence of the Restitutions to be made to it; it were sufficient to compare the System of France with that of that August House, supposing both of 'em in the same situation, wherein they were in the time of the Treaties of Munster and of the Pyrenees. That Epoch cannot be prejudicial to France, because she began then to be formidable to all the neighbouring States, as much by the superiority of her Forces as by the new Constitution of Italy,

4 MEMORIAL: ANSWER.

Italy, and perhaps elsewhere in her Government; whereas the process of time.

found itself already reduced to the unhappy defensive Part, under which the most Powerful of its Branches did at last sink. But it appears that the United Provinces are throughly informed of those two Systems, seeing they co-operate with as much Vigour as Glory for their Arms to re-establish them. It will be therefore sufficient to touch upon some principal Considerations, which will serve to open the Eyes of those, who might have been dazled by the illusions contained in this Memorial. It is a matter of Fact, that *France* will always be more formidable in its Unity, than the House of *Austria* can ever be with all the great States, that may fall to it by virtue of the most advantageous Treaty. *France* is impenetrable on all sides, by reason of its situation; it is covered on the Landside by a double Rank of Fortress's, and it has a great footing in all the Neighbouring States, because it will keep some Provinces and great places in them: Its Government is such, that it can no more be broken nor grow remiss; its Inhabitants are obedient, and have no other resource but War and Trade; its Maxims do all tend to War, and the States, which may cross her Power, are subject to some internal agitations, or to different interests, which keep them disunited, and very often without motion. To which one may add, a King, who does absolutely dispose of the Lives and Fortunes of his Subjects, who may at any time, and without any contradiction, undertake such a War as he pleases, and whose interest it will be always to undertake Wars, that he may employ his Armies abroad, which he can neither reform, nor keep within his Kingdom, without exposing it to a Civil War. A Nation which furnishes as many Troops as the House of *Austria* and the High Allies together, and one half whereof are more industrious and skill'd in Trade, than any of those who make a profession of it. What may not one say about the Navy of that Crown, about the great advantages it preserves, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Maritime Powers; and which it will always preserve, because of the commodiousness of its Ports, and by reason of its almost unexhaustible number of Seamen, and of the active superiority of its Government. Lastly, a Revenue which exceeds by one half that of the House of *Austria*: A Power, which maintains itself with one fourth part of that Revenue, whilst that of the House of *Austria* cannot maintain itself with its whole Revenue.

venue. Some vast Resources by reason of an Arbitrary Power, besides that Revenue. An Oeconomy in the Finances, which is proof against any Misdemeanours, and a distribution whereby Money comes again through a hundred different Channels into the King's Coffers. If we must therefore compare the System of the House of *Austria* in its two Branches, as the only one that can preserve the Ballance so necessary for the Liberty and Repose of all *Europe*, with that of the Crown of *France*, by what means can that August House attain to any one of those advantages? It may be penetrated on all sides, and by as many Neighbours as there are Powerful, and Warlike Nations in *Europe*. Its Territories, tho of a great Extent, if they be considered in the whole, are nevertheless weak, if they be considered every one by itself, as being divided, and unable to help one another in a defensive War. Its Inhabitants being made up of different Nations, keep no Correspondence one with another; most of them are little skill'd in Trade, and less still in Navigation. Its Government is perplexed by reason of the distance, and of the various influences it ought to have upon different Countries, it is restrained by the Laws, Interests and Maxims of every Country, and consequently slow and easy to be unhinged. In a word, all its power is reduced to the meer advantage of interesting all *Europe* in its preservation. I shall no more enlarge upon this subject, because I can say nothing upon it but what every body knows by the experience of fifty years. Thus our Author pretends by a vain Phantome, which has no Existence but in his own Brains, to remove the just apprehensions we have of the Exorbitant Power and new Maxims of *France*.

G. Tho all those things could be as easily performed as they may be supposed, it is certain that *Europe* would but get out of one danger to fall some years after into another, which perhaps would prove as great as the other; which will be easily acknowledged by the most knowing Men, if they reflect upon the Elevation of the House of *Austria*, which would follow from the pretended depression of *France*. We need

G. I grant that those things cannot be easily performed, which destroy the frivolous Consequences of the false supposition I have already mentioned. But that *Europe* should fall into no less a danger thro' the Elevation of the House of *Austria*, considered as being in an Emperor, is a thing more absurd still. The Power of an Emperor of that House was never so formidable as it was under the Emperor *Charles V.*

6 MEMORIAL.

only consider, that if the High Allies were so far victorious, as to disable France from resisting them, things would not end with the dethroning of King Philip V, and the entire and peaceable possession of all the Spanish Monarchy for the Archduke, under the Name of Charles III, but the Emperor would increase his power in Germany and Italy to such a degree, that he would be almost Master of 'em; seeing in such a case he would in all likelihood take possession of all Alsatia, as belonging formerly to the House of Austria, and could not be obliged to restore Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, which stand very convenient for him.

from time to time, in order to keep the Ballance between those two Houses? If afterwards he penetrated into France, which was then open in so many places, could he ever make any considerable Conquest there, or preserve it? But what deserves to be more consider'd still, could he ever retake from that Crown the three Bishopricks which King Henry II. Son of Francis I. Usurped in his time over the Empire, whatever efforts he used to succeed in it? Lastly, how narrowly did he escape being surprized by the Elector of Saxony at *Inspruck*, where he thought himself to be very safe; and if the Mountains had not favoured his flight, two who would have fancied, that so Powerful and so Glorious an Emperor might have been the Prisoner of his Vassal?

If therefore the most formidable of all the Emperors of the House of Austria has not been able to recover the first Usurpations, which France, tho at that time confined within its bounds, made over the Empire; and if it be a matter of Fact, that that Emperor never made use of his Power to usurp any thing, but on the contrary to protect and gratifie his Neighbours; what umbrage can France give now adays of the power of an Emperor of his House, after all the changes which have happened in the Empire and elsewhere, and which have so considerably weakened

ANSWER.

That Monarch was cloathed with the Imperial Dignity, and in possession of all the Spanish Monarchy, he commanded his own Armies, and was looked upon as the greatest and the most happy General of his time. He was so fortunate as to take the King of France Prisoner at the Battel of Pavia, and to make himself dreaded in *Africa* and *Germany*: Nevertheless, what did he get by all his great Exploits, but the glory of having overcome, and made use of his Victories with Moderation? Nay did he not complain, that that restless King exhausted him by his continual Ruptures; and was not Henry VIII. King of England, obliged to help him

the

MEMORIAL. ANSWER. 7

the Imperial Authority, as well as the Power of his House; especially if the least part of the States of the Spanish Monarchy was taken from that House? To this Reason may be added, the disadvantageous situation of an Emperour, which exposes him to infinite Diversions from so many Powers, wherewith he is surrounded. To judge of it, we need only consider how much he has been weakened by the Insurrection of the Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologne*, and by the present Rebellion of the *Hungarians*. If *France* has not been so lucky as to get the *Turks*, or one of the Northern Crowns to fall upon him, 'tis not for want of Sollicitations, Promises and Bribes. We are but too well informed of her Plots and Devices every where for that end: Hell wou'd not be too much, if she could stir it up against that August House.

Upon this ground one may easily see, that all that has been insinuated by the Author in the foregoing Article, concerning the *General Liberty of Europe*, and the *Independency of Sovereigns*, as well as all the frivolous Consequences which he heaps up in this Article, about the imaginary danger from the Elevation of the House of *Austria*, is but a meer illusion, which is necessary to him for the above mentioned design. None of the Inconveniences, whereof he makes so long a deduction, will happen, if the High Allies are so fortunate as to restore by this War the Ballance, as it ought to be: and of which the Maritime Powers may then be sure Guarantees. The only difference in respect to them will be, that in order to prevent a greater Elevation of the House of *Austria*, they need only deprive it for a time of their Assistance; whereas to prevent that of *France*, they must oppose her with all their Forces, and those of the House of *Austria*; a Truth which is made good by the Comparison of the two Systems, and confirmed by the Experience of all the Wars that have been between those two Houses, since the Treaties of *Munster* and of the *Pyrenees*.

H. His Imperial Majesty would get by the same means the *Franchise Comté*, which was a Member of the Spanish Monarchy, and he would have the Administration thereof, and of the Dutchy of *Milan*, as of a Fief of the Empire; and according to the same Supposition, it is not likely that

H. It is natural for a Frenchman to think and speak according to the Genius of his Nation: They know in *France* the worth of a well managed Chicanery; they know how far one may carry the Right of an Annex, or of a Dependency; they know how to revive some super-

8 MEMORIAL.

he wou'd be contented with the Spanish Netherlands, such as they were before the death of the late King of Spain.

ANSWER.

annuated, or abolish'd Titles ; they know how to elude, by a great many subtilties, the natural sense of Treaties, how to interpret them to their own advantage, and to pick up a quarrel about an Ambiguous Term. We leave all those fashionable things to *France*, without envying them. The House of *Austria* acts upon other Principles : it will be very happy to preserve its own, such as shall be restored by a Treaty, without being Ambitious of what does not belong to it. That House knows well enough that it is highly concerned to cultivate the Confidence and Affection of all its Neighbours, by its Sincerity, seeing its Safety depends upon it.

I. *The Court of Vienna enjoying such a pretended happiness, and being in a condition to give the Law to others, supposing that France was overcome in this War, wou'd lay a Claim to the restitution of whatever was yielded to it by the Treaty of Aix la Chappelle and Nimeguen, which they call in France the Conquered Provinces of the Netherlands, wherein it might be supported by its chief Allies, who are afraid of the Neighbourhood of France ; and then the Imperial Court would not fail to desire that Lorrain, with the three Bishopricks of Metz, Toul and Verdun should be reunited to the Body of the Empire.*

I. We know what an Emperor can do, and what he cannot do : The Imperial Constitutions, the Recesses, and the Capitulations do so much confine his Authority, that he cannot abuse it ; and to impute the Crimes of *France* to him, is to banter the Publick ; for to suppose that he will make several Conquests one after another, and measure his Right by his Power, as *France* never ceased to do in her Prosperity, is to disguise the Imperial Authority under such colours, as only suit the Crown of *France*. We are but too well convinced that the Government of the Empire is not at all calculated for an Offensive War ; happy wou'd it

be if it were calculated for a just Defensive one. To be convinced of that truth, we need only consider with what facility *France* never ceased for these two hundred years to plot in the Empire, and imbroil it ; and with what success it has been able to turn the Arms of that great Body against its Emperors and its own Interest : This way will be always open to her, notwithstanding any Treaty whatsoever ; and at the worst the *Turks*, or some other Neighbouring Nations, will never fail her, whenever she wants them.

K. Be-

MEMORIAL.

K. Because the Duke of Mantua has been proscribed by the Empire, or because 'tis pretended at Vienna that he ought to be proscribed, that Prince would be deprived of all his States, and they would be bestowed upon some Princes affectionate to the Emperor: The same would be done for the Electorate of Cologn, and the Bishoprick of Liege; which is the natural Course of things, supposing that France should sink under this War. And according to that supposition, it may be said that the Partisans of the two Crowns, who have their States and Dignities in the Empire, and in the Territories of the Spanish Monarchy, would be almost undone.

L. Which is a dangerous extremity, seeing it would not fail to occasion new Wars hereafter, into which all the Sovereigns will enter, being jealous and afraid of the excessive Power of the House of Austria in Germany and Italy.

to aggrandize herself more and more, or to recover her Losses? And who will be those jealous Sovereigns, unless it be those whom she may allure, as she usually does, with the hopes of getting the Spoils of the House of Austria?

I desire that I may be allowed to ask these Questions: When France had obtained by the Treaty of Munster, two free Passages into Germany, thro the important places of Brisac and Philipsburgh; and by the Treaty of the Pyrenees an entrance into the Spanish Netherlands, the United Provinces and Spain; did she leave the bordering States undisturbed for one moment? Did she leave off Ravaging and Usurping, in a full Peace, as well

ANSWER. 9

K: I should spend my time to no purpose, shou'd I go about to refute all the Chimical Deductions, which the Author continues to heap up upon the same false supposition. What a Misfortune would it be for all the Nations of the World if Heaven should fall upon 'em; and how many things might one say about every one of them upon that supposition? Such is the Argument of our Author: For if that Supposition be but a meer Phantom, what will become of the Consequence? How happy would the Fate of Europe be, if the House of Austria was in a condition to give such an umbrage, one might be sure at least that France and her Partisans would soon remove it.

L. A pleasant Extremity, which is only grounded upon Whimseys. To infer that the restoration of the Ballance of Europe will occasion new Wars, is a thing that may excite the attention of the High Allies; for who will undertake those new Wars, unless it be France,

as

TO MEMORIAL. ANSWER.

as in the middle of War? And is it not by the same ways that she attained to that great Power, which makes her at this day the Terror of Europe? But if her depression will prove the occasion of new Wars, because she will endeavour to *revenge herself*, and will never want ready and infallible Springs to engage, even the Barbarous Nations in her Quarrel? Is it not to reduce the High Allies to another Extremity, *viz.* to lay all at stake during this War, *that* she may be disabled from undertaking any War for the time to come?

M. If France was overcome, and brought low, she would be excited hereafter to revenge herself by all those, who shall think to get some benefit by raising new Troubles in Christendom, the number whereof is always very great.

at the Universal Monarchy. 'Tis upon that vain Phantom, that all the Impressions she gave every where of its Power, did run; and how many envenomed Darts did she always make use of, to inspire others with such Pannick Fear. That Phantom did no sooner vanish away by the visible depression of that August House, but she returned to the charge another way: She was of opinion that there were too many States re-united in that House; and the return was to be feared in a change of Fortune. Such has been the second way, whereby she continued to aggrandize herself, alluring some of the bordering States with the hopes of part of its Spoils, and reserving always the best share to herself: This Game she played as long as she could find some body or other to play with: At laist, when she perceived that her Game was discovered, and that her Neighbours were again Alarmed with her Rising Power, did she did not pull off her Mask, and discover an Ambition more pernicious to all the Neighbouring States, than that of the Ottoman Empire in the midst of its Conquests.

N. So that if things were duly examined without partiality, it wou'd be found, that the pretended depression of France is not a safe way, to restore the Ballance, and establish a lasting tranquility in Europe: One might

M. France will not be excited, but she will excite others, as she never ceased to do for almost these 2 hundred years past. As long as the House of Austria was in a condition of giving some umbrage, France never ceased to exclaim in all the Courts of Europe, that it aimed

N. When things are examined without partiality, it will be found, that that pretended depression of France is a meer Chymera, as well as the Elevation of the House of Austria, which should result from it sooner

sooner attain to it, and with more certainty, by using some moderate expedients, and such as are fit to settle a Peace, that may be just and agreeable to both Parties: They shall be explain'd in the sequel of this Memorial with all possible impartiality, and a sincere affection for both parties, in order to procure the general Good of Christendom, which is my principal Objett.

the shifts which our Author makes use of in this place, tend only to impose upon the High Allies, if it were possible. After all, one may contrive as many Peaces as he will; but will that Peace prove more solid than the four last? Will the Treaty be expressed in clearer and more energical terms? Will the Form thereof be more solemn, and the Oaths more obligatory than those, which are taken upon the Holy Gospels? Or has any one found out another Law of Nations, another Publick Faith, and another Religion, whereby that new Treaty may be kept inviolably? Or if there is no such thing, may we rely upon some of those Heavenly Intelligences, who preside over Monarchies, that will warrant its duration? But if no other precautions can be taken, but those that were taken in all the precedent Treaties, how shall we be sure that France will more sincerely observe this: Will she change her Genius and her Maxims? And when she finds herself in a proper situation to undertake any thing, will she leave off using that Reason as a Title to do it as soon as her Enemies have disarmed?

O. However, I am not so rash and so presumptuous as to fancy, that so many important and opposite Interests may be regulated by them; besides, things are in such a situation, that they may alter all of a sudden, whereby the Proposals, which might seem now just and agreeable to the interests of France, and of the Confederate Powers, would become impracticable.

The thing in Question is to restore the Ballance of Europe, as the only means of establishing a Peace, that may be solid, just, and suitable to both Parties. Those moderate and fit Expedients can be nothing else, but the Restitutions that ought to be made to the House of Austria, upon the foot of the two before-mentioned Treaties; and this is what France is afraid of: All

O. I see the Author mistrusts those moderate and fit Expedients, which he is going to propose; but he insinuates some others, upon which he does not explain himself yet; and 'tis likely that he will regulate himself according to the good or ill success, which the Arms of France shall have this next Campaign. In the mean time, I cannot forbear telling him be-

12 MEMORIAL. ANSWER.

beforehand, that those so important and so opposite interests run only upon the Restitutions, which ought to be made to the House of *Austria*; and therefore 'tis the part of that House to satisfy its Allies, who are so much concern'd for it, and whom it ought to preserve for the time to come.

P. Nevertheless it may be said for the publick interest of Europe, that if the Court of France is disposed to Peace, she must of necessity take proper measures to overcome the obstacles, which may retard the effect thereof. In order therunto she must at first win the confidence of her Enemies, by such proceedings as may clearly shew the sincerity of her dispositions for the general tranquility of Christendom.

R. Nothing wou'd more contribute to it than the advantageous and safe conditions, which she might offer, to move the High Allies to consent to a Truce, in order to negotiate a general Peace according to the usual forms: Which cannot be done, as has been said, in a little time, because of the different Powers concerned in it.

difficulty, because the diversity of the Powers, and their many different Interests may be reconciled in four words, *ante omnia spoliatus restitutur*. Without this preliminary condition, any proposal for a Truce must needs be insidious to the High Allies; seeing the dissolution of all the precedent Confederacies began with the like Artifices. I grant that a Truce may serve to negotiate a Peace; but it is when the two Parties find an equal and mutual advantage in it: But it wou'd be quite contrary in this case, seeing France wou'd enjoy the Spanish Monarchy, whilst the High Allies wou'd remain with empty hands; and besides wou'd

P. That publick interest of Europe, which the Author seems to be tender of in this place, out of a vain ostentation of sincerity, tends only to palliate the Illusions and Snares, which we shall see by and by. But he speaks right and agreeably to the Maxims of France, when he grants elsewhere that whatever comes from her ought to be suspected by the High Allies, and this is our case.

R. Those advantageous and safe conditions can be nothing else but the Restitutions I have mentioned; and the offers thereof ought to be positive, that they may serve as a preliminary for a Peace; so that if an Assembly be made for it, it shou'd be only in order to sign it. Such a precaution, which the precedent Overtures and Congresses of Peace have made so necessary, is liable to no great difficulty,

wou'd be obliged to keep up their Armies without any use, and at their own charges. But there is more still : *France* wants a Truce : 1. To put herself in a condition of sowing Discord amongst the High Allies, that she may easily plot amongst 'em, or at least disunite some of the Allies by some particular offers, as she is going to make some here : For what may not one fear from her Bribes, as soon as she has the least access to a Court ? 2. To repair her Land and Sea Forces, which were weaken'd by the losses of the last Campaign. 3. To make an end of destroying the Party of the House of *Austria* in all the parts of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and to settle herself in her possession : But because those Ends are directly contrary to the design of this War, I leave to every one to judge whether such a Proposal is not a formal snare, and of the same nature with those, the dismal effects whereof the Allies have so often experimented. Another Reflection ought to be made upon this subject, *viz.* That tho' *France* were altogether at the charges of her Armies, as it happen'd in the preceding Wars, yet her condition wou'd be without any comparison more advantageous than that of the Allies. Her Armies are made up of her own Subjects : She has on all sides a vast extent, which reaches into the Neighbouring States, to subsist them ; and besides, she must always keep up her Armies ; seeing her Interest has made it a Law, and the danger of disarming, a Necessity. But the case is altered ; the whole *Spanish* Monarchy must contribute to it, and even in a double respect, as being Conquered and less Exhausted : From whence one may judge, that nothing could be more favourable and advantageous to *France*, and consequently more prejudicial to the High Allies than a Truce.

R. And the many different Interests, which ought to be managed and reconciled with those of Trade, which it is so necessary to regulate, to prevent the difficulties which might arise upon that account.

R. 'Tis no wonder that the Author shou'd tickle the Subjects of the Maritime Powers, by mentioning their Trade, seeing it is the part wherein they are most sensible ; but what regulations can one make about it, besides those that were already made in the Treaties of *Nimeguen* and *Reswick* ? *France*, in order to allure these Nations in the midst of the Negotiation of those two Treaties, promised them all sorts of advantages to Trade in her Ports ; and indeed some Treaties were made in consequence thereof, to make that Trade sure, and clear all the

14 MEMORIAL. ANSWER.

parts of it; but how long did she keep those Treaties, and how many shifts did she use to elude them? But if that Crown has been able to impose upon their Credulity, at a time when she was highly concerned to shew a great regard for them, in order to execute her great design, as it appeared as soon as the last Treaty was concluded, what must they expect when her Power is grown to such a degree as to be able to contend with them for the Trade of both Seas? Let them therefore be undeceived: The Trade of the Maritime Powers depends only upon the restoration of the Ballance, as it has been already said; for if their Trade must always lessen according as *France* encreases hers, as their Trading-men own it, what may they not fear from thence under any other System?

S. When France resolved upon the Peace, which was afterwards concluded at Nimeguen, she did voluntarily abandon before-hand all that she had conquered in the United Provinces, except Maestricht: She did the same with the Kingdom of Sicily, because she foresaw, that she wou'd be obliged to restore it by the Treaty of Peace, which was a stroke of great Wisdom, as well as her permitting His Royal Highness to do whatever that Prince could reasonably desire.

ting all; the match being too strong, since the Emperor and several Princes of the Empire came to their assistance; she did it likewise to carry the whole force of her Arms into the Spanish *Netherlands*, which lay more convenient for her; and where she wou'd meet with less resistance. *Sicily* was abandoned for the same reasons, tho not so voluntarily as the Author insinuates: For it is well known that this happened by the pressing Sollicitations of *Charles II. King of England*, who could no longer resist the instances of his Parliament, and the publick discontents of his people. Such have been those *Strokes of Wisdom*, which the Author does so much extol, and which are precisely the same, which we ought to suspect in the present Juncture;

*S. The Author should have in Prudence avoided to mention any thing that might revive the Artifices, which *France* made use of to force the unhappy Peace of Nimeguen: They are well known by their dismal effects; and seeing he had a mind to mention them, he might at least have disguised them: But we ought to thank him for his warning. It is true that *France* did voluntarily abandon before-hand all that she had conquered in the United Provinces except *Mae- stricht*; but she did it after she had lost the hopes of conquer-*

not

MEMORIAL. AN ANSWER. 17

not to run upon the same Rocks, which were so fatal to the Liberties of Europe.

T. Upon those principles one may boldly suppose, that it being the interest of the Court of France to free herself from the present War as soon as possible, to ease the Subjects of the great burden they have been obliged to bear, and make 'em enjoy a happy tranquility, which wou'd restore that Kingdom to a most flourishing condition, she might, when she is sure of the success of a Truce, which cannot fail to be attended with a favourable Peace for all Europe, restore things in the Low Countries upon the same foot they were on before the death of the late King of Spain.

Her Finances, to secure her Conquests, and disarm her Enemies. 'Tis true, that she must now and then make some restitutions, but it is only to cover her Game the better, because keeping the Principal, she never fails to indemnifie herself by a hundredfold at every Rupture. 'Tis by such steps that France is arrived to the high degree of Power, which she has at present. Three Peaces one after another have been bought of her, and a Truce, which has proved so prejudicial to the Empire: The more has been yielded to her, the more she wou'd always have; and because every Sacrifice enabled her more and more to make new Attempts, her Armies proved more formidable at every Rupture. It has been necessary to Arm in proportion, for fear of being forced to yield; which has occasioned great expences, which the Allies have not been able to bear long; whilst France has been able to bear the charges she was at, because she got considerably by every Peace. Thus, having bought many Peaces, they are now reduced to such a sad extremity, as to have no reason to hope for a reasonable and lasting one. It is true, that the High Allies suffer most by the excessive charges of this War, and besides those, who are most exposed, are so unhappy

T. A Principle is a constant and acknowledg'd truth; but our Author has paid us hitherto with mere words, chimerical suppositions and illusions, which will no longer deceive the World. However, I will admit as a certain Principle, that it is the interest of the Court of France, to get, as soon as possible, out of the present War, because it cannot but be prejudicial to her, by reason of its long duration and extension, tho she is so happy as to make it every where in the Enemies Country. She wants some short Wars to employ usefully all her Forces, and then some slight Intervals of Peace, to restore

14 MEMORIAL. ANSWER.

parts of it; but how long did she keep those Treaties, and how many shifts did she use to elude them? But if that Crown has been able to impose upon their Credulity, at a time when she was highly concerned to shew a great regard for them, in order to execute her great design, as it appeared as soon as the last Treaty was concluded, what must they expect when her Power is grown to such a degree as to be able to contend with them for the Trade of both Seas? Let them therefore be undeceived: The Trade of the Maritime Powers depends only upon the restoration of the Ballance, as it has been already said; for if their Trade must always lessen according as France encreases hers, as their Trading-men own it, what may they not fear from thence under any other System?

S. When France resolved upon the Peace, which was afterwards concluded at Nimeguen, she did voluntarily abandon before-hand all that she had conquered in the United Provinces, except Maestricht: She did the same with the Kingdom of Sicily, because she foresaw, that she wou'd be obliged to restore it by the Treaty of Peace, which was a stroke of great Wisdom, as well as her permitting His Royal Highness to do whatever that Prince could reasonably desire.

S. The Author should have in Prudence avoided to mention any thing that might revive the Artifices, which France made use of to force the unhappy Peace of Nimeguen: They are well known by their dismal effects; and seeing he had a mind to mention them, he might at least have disguised them: But we ought to thank him for his warning. It is true that France did voluntarily abandon before-hand all that she had conquered in the United Provinces except Maestricht; but she did it after she had lost the hopes of conquer-

ting all; the match being too strong, since the Emperor and several Princes of the Empire came to their assistance; she did it likewise to carry the whole force of her Arms into the Spanish Netherlands, which lay more convenient for her; and where she wou'd meet with less resistance. Sicily was abandoned for the same reasons, tho not so voluntarily as the Author insinuates: For it is well known that this happened by the pressing Sollicitations of Charles II. King of England, who could no longer resist the instances of his Parliament, and the publick discontents of his people. Such have been those Strokes of Wisdom, which the Author does so much extol, and which are precisely the same, which we ought to suspect in the present Juncture;

not

MEMORIAL. I A ANSWER. 15

not to run upon the same Rocks, which were so fatal to the Liberties of Europe.

T. Upon those principles one may boldly suppose, that it being the interest of the Court of France to free herself from the present War as soon as possible, to ease the Subjects of the great burden they have been obliged to bear, and make 'em enjoy a happy tranquility, which wou'd restore that Kingdom to a most flourishing condition, she might, when she is sure of the success of a Truce, which cannot fail to be attended with a favourable Peace for all Europe, restore things in the Low Countries upon the same foot they were on before the death of the late King of Spain.

Her Finances, to secure her Conquests, and disarm her Enemies. 'Tis true, that she must now and then make some restitutions; but it is only to cover her Game the better, because keeping the Principal, she never fails to indemnifie herself by a hundredfold at every Rupture. 'Tis by such steps that France is arrived to the high degree of Power, which she has at present. Three Peaces one after another have been bought of her, and a Truce, which has proved so prejudicial to the Empire: The more has been yielded to her, the more she wou'd always have; and because every Sacrifice enabled her more and more to make new Attempts, her Armies proved more formidable at every Rupture. It has been necessary to Arm in proportion, for fear of being forced to yield; which has occasioned great expences, which the Allies have not been able to bear long; whilst France has been able to bear the charges she was at, because she got considerably by every Peace. Thus, having bought many Peaces, they are now reduced to such a sad extremity, as to have no reason to hope for a reasonable and lasting one. It is true, that the High Allies suffer most by the excessive charges of this War, and besides those, who are most exposed, are so unhappy

T. A Principle is a constant and acknowledg'd truth; but our Author has paid us hitherto with meer words, chimerical suppositions and illusions, which will no longer deceive the World. However, I will admit as a certain Principle, that it is the interest of the Court of France, to get, as soon as possible, out of the present War, because it cannot but be prejudicial to her, by reason of its long duration and extension, tho she is so happy as to make it every where in the Enemies Country. She wants some short Wars to employ usefully all her Forces, and then some slight Intervals of Peace, to restore

16 MEMORIAL. *ANSWER.*

as to see the War in their own Country ; but if they have learn'd by an experience of 40 years, that nothing but the restoration of the Ballance can bring *France* to reason, and secure their Independence and Repose ; it is certain that they ought not to be sorry for those Expences ; seeing it is the surest and most useful way of saving they can leave to their Posterity. They thought to get something, by putting off the War to another time ; but they did always lose by it, the Match proved stronger every time : This is the last struggle, seeing the safety of *Europe* depends upon it.

I grant also, that *it is the interest of France to get out of the present War as soon as possible* ; but we have no reason to believe that it is in order to make her People enjoy a happy tranquility : For if it were so, why did she disturb it by so many unjust Wars, which she undertook without any cause, since the Treaties of *Munster* and of the *Pyrenees*? They who are acquainted with the Constitutions and Maxims of her Government, will easily perceive, that if the interest of the People has any share in it, it is only in order to enable them to bear in a little time the charges of a new War, that she may take at last what she will miss now.

France, as it stands at present, must needs be sure, that if her Enemies suffer themselves to be decoyed by a Truce, such as she proposes it, the Peace is infallible ; but what Peace? *Bellum nomine pacis involutum*, such as the three last have been ; for to tell us such a Peace will be favourable to all *Europe*, is a thing to be proved, and which the Author will never be able to do : Other Ingredients are necessary for it ; one may know *France* by her way of speaking.

Q. Which would engage her to remove her Troops from the principal places of that Country where they would be Garrisoned again by the Forces of the United Provinces, and then *U. France* has her reasons to begin always with luring the *United Provinces* ; but I cannot believe that the lure of putting into their hands the broken rents of the *Spanish Netherlands*, who ought to have for lands can be strong enough to ever the privative Guard of 'em, dazzle 'em, after they have been to form a Barrier necessary for so often deceived by the like allurements.

Q. The remaining part of Europe in general, seeing that Country being contiguous to the preservation and growth of *I. The* remaining part of to the noble Provinces she has that

MEMORIAL. ANSWER. 17

that powerful Republick will be invaded, being surrounded with the best means of securing their Independency and Liberty. her strong places, and lying so conveniently for her, must needs fall into her hands at the first Rupture; and there is no doubt but that she consents to such infidious Depositum, in hopes of such a thing.

II. It is a great piece of injustice for *France* to dispose in that manner of the Ancient Patrimony of the House of *Austria*, without knowing first whether it will consent to it or not. But suppose that House should consent to it out of necessity, or compliance, it may be a question whether the Inhabitants would be pleased with such an agreement. It is true, that they have always been very faithful to that August House; even so as to bear constantly, for the space of an hundred and fifty years, the burthen of the continual Wars between the two Crowns; but *Spain*, by way of requital, sent all her Treasures to them to protect 'em, and she was ruined by it. What will they do when they see themselves abandoned to a Foreign protection, their Country condemned to be the Seat of new Wars, *France* always threatening them, and her Forces always ready to oppres them? They cannot like very well such a situation; and who knows but that out of despair they will throw themselves into the Arms of *France*? That Crown expects without doubt such a thing, seeing one may very well presume that she will receive them with less relunctancy still, than she received heretofore the *Catalans* and the Inhabitants of *Messina*.

III. That the privative Guard of those places should be an advantage to the United Provinces, as well to serve them as a Barrier, as to make their Republick more powerful, must needs be look'd upon as a meer illusion: For, had they not their Troops in the principal Places of the Low Countries before the beginning of this War; and how easily did *France* turn 'em out, as soon as she saw that she was sure of *Spain* and of the States of *Italy*? Did they dare make any resistance, and was she not like to carry the War into their Provinces, upon a meer delay? Whenever *France* has a mind to get over that Barrier, as she will infallibly do it, as soon as she is free from other Business, what Troops will they have to make head against her? And supposing that they would keep a Standing Army, which would be more insupportable to them than the War it self, what would they do, if *France*, leaving the Barrier untouched, should attack them with all her Forces in the Center, as she did in the Campaign of

18 MEMORIAL. ANSWER.

1672? Can they flatter themselves to have some Allies always ready, and with sufficient Troops to come to their assistance? For *France* may use several means to hinder the Emperour, the Empire, *England* and the Duke of *Savoy* from thinking upon it. Perhaps one Age will not afford so favourable a Conjunction for them as this is.

IV. Tho *France* would separate the Interest of the Maritime Powers from that of the House of *Austria*, and remove by that privative Guard the Jealousy which the keeping of the Low Countries wou'd create in them, it is certain that that snare, if considered with respect to *England*, is no less gross than with respect to the United Provinces. Those Powers ought therefore to be always united and armed for the defence of the places and of the Country: As for that Union, who knows how long it will last, and how many ways may it be dissolved, as soon as the Peace is made, not to say that it will be always the interest of *France* to break it by her secret Cabals, which she may easily do? As for the Standing Armies, tho the United Provinces would maintain theirs with the Contributions they might raise in the Country committed to their keeping, it may be a question whether the Crown of *England* might keep her own Forces. The *English* Nation is too jealous of her Liberty to suffer a Standing Army without a pressing and unavoidable necessity: As it appeared immediately after the Treaty of *Reswick* was signed, King *William* being forced by the Parliament to cashier all the Troops he had on foot, tho it was easy to perceive, that *France* made preparations for a new War, which would prove more difficult than all the precedent; and that that Prince being a Protestant, advanced in years, and without Heirs, it could not be presumed that he would abuse his Authority, to break the Laws and Privileges of the Nation.

V. But let us suppose farther, that *England* would be perswaded to keep a Standing Army, that her Union with the United Provinces be unalterable, and that their Forces be sufficient to stop the progress of *France*, which is contrary to the experience of this War and of the last, who can assure them, that as soon as the Incomparable Queen, who supports that Crown with so much Glory and Wisdom, comes to fail, there will not happen such divisions in that Kingdom upon account of the Succession, that, instead of being in a condition to succour their Allies, they themselves will want a Foreign assistance? We see already that *France* takes great care to cultivate the Seeds of those

those divisions by the secret Intelligence she keeps in the three Kingdoms.

Those Considerations are so strong and so palpable, that I challenge all the *French* to contradict them; and therefore we must necessarily return to the Ballance I have mentioned, as being the only Barrier that can hold out against *France*, and secure the *Liberty of Europe and the Independency of its Sovereigns*. Besides that general Interest, there is also a private one for the Maritime Powers; I mean, that they will be sure to enjoy always the whole Trade of the States of the *Spanish Monarchy*; which they can never promise to themselves, being in the hands of *France*, or at her disposal, under a King of the House of *Bourbon*. This is a Truth grounded upon Reason, as may be seen in the Treatise entitled, *The Partition of the Lion in the Fable, Part I.* which is but too much confirmed by the Events of this War, tho the States of that Monarchy are not yet upon the *French* foot.

X. *We shall see hereafter how this might be done, without doing any wrong to the Elector of Bavaria, whom it is well known that France is obliged in honour to take care of by the Treaty of Peace, that shall be made, as well as of the Elector of Cologne his Brother.*

Posterity. I shall not enlarge here upon the importance of those services, nor upon the nature of the Merit of that House, because such an enquiry is foreign to my design. It is enough for me to acquaint the United Provinces in particular, that under whatever title the Elector of *Bavaria* preserves the enjoyment of the broken remnants of the *Spanish Netherlands*, his Neighbourhood will be as formidable to them as that of *France*; because he'll do nothing but in concert with that Crown, and that it is the interest of the latter to invade them on the first occasion, and then she will indemnifie him by an Equivalent, which may be more convenient to him. It will be worse still, if the Elector of *Cologne* is re-established in his Electorate; for it will be a complicated Evil: Which may be proved by the Campagn of 1672.

X. I grant that the House of *Bavaria* has done most important services to *France*, and that she is obliged in honour to reward them. But that such a reward shou'd be taken from what belongs to the House of *Austria*, it is a thing against all manner of Justice, and of a very scandalous example for

20 MEMORIAL

Y. And to favour willingly the useful and glorious advantages, which have been promised to the Duke of Savoy by the High Allies, and which have been explained in the first Memorial of these Remarks ; the Peace putting an end to all occasions of hatred and animosities, 'tis likely that as soon as the Truce is agreed upon, the French will make no difficulty to recall their Troops from Savoy, and in the Valley of Aosta, and to evacuate all the Places they have taken in Piedmont and in the County of Nice.

which have been promised him by the High Allies. A benefit, which consists only in leaving to a Man what cannot be taken from him, can scarce be accounted a Benefit, unless it be understood of those, who profess to take away all : Besides, the Duke is so nearly allied to the Royal House of France, that he might very well hope, besides the restitution of his States, to be indemnified by that Crown for all the Ravages his Armies have made in his Country. But if those useful and glorious advantages must be taken from what belongs to the House of Austria, or to another Prince, whose loss must be made good by that House, by indemnifying his Heirs ; let her leave to that August House the care of performing her Treaties : It is well known that she is not wont to fail in it.

One might ask the Author on this occasion, Whether France is always so Religious in the performance of her Treaties : For, to mention only that of Ryswick, which is the last, how many shifts did she use, to put off the Evacuation of Erisac, expecting the Death of the late Catholick King, which was to occasion a Rupture ; and how many other shifts about the restitutions to be made to the House of Montpeliard ? Lastly, cou'd she resolve hitherto to give an Equivalent to the Duke of Lorrain for the City and Provostship of Longvick, tho it was stipulated by the same Treaty : Will she do it now after Eight years entreaties and solicitations ? That Equivalent for above 60 Towns and Vil-

ANSWER.

Y. If we were not well informed of the irreconcileable hatred of the Court of France for the Duke of Savoy, the magnificent Expressions of the Author might give occasion to the Allies to suspect that Prince, tho France has provided against it by the constant efforts she made to destroy him, even so as to sacrifice some Armies in order to it, which might have been more useful somewhere else. But what do those magnificent Expressions of useful and glorious advantages which she is willing to favour amount to, unless it be to ascribe to herself those

Vil-

Villages, which *France* keeps from him, must be taken from what is her own; which is the subject of the Chirycane: A Village, a Farm of her Territory, is for her a sufficient motive of dispute, whilst she devours Monarchies. Yet the Duke of *Lorrain* is no less allied to the Royal House of *France*, than the Duke of *Savoy*; and that which is more aggravating still, is that he never gave any occasion of complaint or trouble to that Crown. But those two Princes have known long ago, at their own costs, that it is with her Neighbourhood, as with the Eagle's Feathers, which consume that of other Birds. They must expect no other favour but that of *Polypemus*.

Z. *In favour of the said Truce, which shou'd be general, to form only the Preliminaries of the Peace, which it is so necessary to hasten, I suppose the Court of France may also grant the demolition of Fort Louis, with the restitution of that of Kehl, and some other Articles of that nature favourable to the Empire.*

other offers, it is certain that it cannot *be look'd upon but as a snare*, which, she reserves to herself, to endeavour to disunite, by some particular offers the Electors and Princes of the *Rhine*, who are most exposed, or some others to whom she may have access, as she did in all the Overtures of the foregoing Peaces: Being well perswaded by Experience that the General Good of the Empire is not always minded by the several Members of it.

A a. *And that she wou'd shew no repugnancy to restore the Places taken in Portugal, and the Dutchy of Modena to its Duke.*

'tis well known that they are of no importance, and that they may embarrass *France*, by reason of the useless Garrisons, which she must keep in them, after having ruined the Country. Besides, the Duke of *Modena* cannot be considered as a constitutive Member of the League: He had made a Treaty of Neutrality with *France*; and if she broke it, to invade his States; at a time when they lay convenient for her, the restitution thereof, and the indemnifying of the Duke, are things which concern her in particular, and she has no right to put them upon the account of the High Allies.

B b. *In the mean time the High Allies might remain in possession (till the conclusion and entire ratification of the general Peace) of the important places of Gibraltar and Landau; and likewise of all those which they*

Z. I have already said what I intended about that Truce, and the way of hastening it. That *Lure*, which concerns the Empire, ought not to be paralleled with the just satisfactions it may pretend to, for so many usurpations and ravages, which *France* have made in it since the Treaty of *Munster*; as for the Author's Restriction about some other offers, it is certain that it cannot *be look'd upon but as a snare*, which, she reserves to herself, to endeavour to disunite, by some particular offers the Electors and Princes of the *Rhine*, who are most exposed, or some others to whom she may have access, as she did in all the Overtures of the foregoing Peaces: Being well perswaded by Experience that the General Good of the Empire is not always minded by the several Members of it.

A a. Such a Repugnancy wou'd be very unseasonable, seeing we hear that the *Portuguese* have already prevented it; as for the Places of the Dutchy of *Modena*,

B b. It is a most absurd thing for the Author to compare the places of *Gibraltar, Landau, Bonn* and *Limburg*, with a whole Monarchy, which must remain in the hands, or at the disposal of *France*,

22 MEMORIAL.

bold in the Archbischoprick of Cologn and the Bishoprick of Liege, with the Province of Limburg, and the Conquests they have made upon the Maeſe.

judge of what use that precious interval wou'd be to her, to overthrow in Spain and elsewhere the Party of King Charles, and to prevent the good success which the Maritime Powers have reason to expect from their Troops and Fleets.

C. *Tho a Truce upon such conditions wou'd be extremely advantageous and glorious for the High Allies, it is certain, that the French Politicians, who will examine those Overtures to the bottom, can find nothing in them that is prejudicial to the Kingdom, or to the Glory of his Most Christian Majesty, if it be true, that the most lawful and best grounded glory of a Monarch consists in following the true interest of his State, and in knowing how to accommodate himself to Time and Conjunctions; not to expose himself to dangers, which may be avoided by Prudence and Moderation, the use whereof does very well become the greatest Princes: And therefore one may reasonably presume that so penetrating and so experienced a Monarch as the Most Christian King is acknowledg'd to be, will not fail to make a seasonable use of both of them, in this important juncture, to make way for a Peace, seeing it is the thing which that great Prince aims at, and there is no shorter way to attain to it.*

to prove whether the Peace, which is advantageous to the High Allies or not.

D. *It is not likely that the motion of the Armies, and the most plausible hopes, which the High Allies might have about the success of this Campaign, wou'd make 'em reject a Truce, and the dispositions to a gene-*

ANSWER.

and in the possession whereof she would settle herself by the help of a Truce. This made him say without doubt in the very first line of this Article, that the Truce ought to be general: For one may easily

C. *That a Truce upon such conditions wou'd be extremely advantageous and glorious to the Allies, is a Paradox against common sense: But it is certain on the other hand, that if the French Politicians examine the mystery of those Overtures to the bottom, they will find them agreeable to the interest of the Kingdom. We ought to understand in the same sense what he adds concerning the obligations of a Sovereign, and which he appropriates to the glory of the Most Christian King: For laying down as a principle, that the most lawful and best grounded glory of a Monarch consists in following the true interest of his State, and in knowing how to accommodate himself to Time and Conjunction, what can one infer from it, but that the Match being too hard for the Most Christian King, his Prudence and Moderation require that he shou'd put off his designs till he finds a more favourable Conjunction. What follows tends only to establish that principle: But it remains*

D. The question is not to know whether the the success of this Campaign will be favourable to the High Allies or not; but whether the Truce will not prove more prejudicial to them than all

MEMORIAL.

ral Peace upon so advantageous a foot as that which I have represented, when they are fully convinced, that the favourable intentions of France are not a Snare, which she would lay for them, to stop their progress, and divide them afterwards: It is well known that Prudence requires that one should mistrust what comes from an Enemy; and therefore the most favourable offers and propositions of the Court of France cannot fail to be suspected at first by the Allies; so that one may very well think that they will not believe them, but when they have secured themselves.

makes particular Offers only to the United Provinces; she knocks at every door; she has her Emissaries every where to open them; there are no Promises or Bribes but what she makes use of to seduce some of the High Allies; which being so, what wou'd she not do under pretence of a Truce, whereby she might have a free entrance every where? But if the continuation of the War is so necessary to the High Allies to preserve their Union, upon which the success of their intention does altogether depend, why should France go to make 'em leave their strong Hold, and reduce 'em to that weakness, which has always been so pernicious to them? This we are taught by that Prudence, which requires that we should mistrust, in general, the Offers of an Enemy, and especially of an Enemy, who has so often surprised them with the like Artifices: To talk of Peace in the midst of a War, and to make War in the midst of a Peace; to suggest a Truce, or a Congress, in order to put ones self in a capacity of dividing Enemies by particular Offers, and thence to force the most obstinate to disadvantageous Treaties, is the Game of France: But it has proved so dismal to the High Allies, that they will not be deceiv'd by it in this juncture.

E e. If after the misfortune, which happen'd to Monsieur de Pointi, I mean to his Squadron of Men of War; and after the raising of the Siege of Gibraltar, which must follow upon it, as 'tis pretended, because of the new Succours that has been thrown into the place, the Spaniards remain faithful and obedient to K. Philip V. the Confederated Powers will have occasion to leave off the hopes of dethroning him, and to be convinced of the insu-

ANSWER. 23

the losses which they might sustain; and likewise whether those dispositions to a general Peace upon that pretended advantageous foot are not a snare, such as the Author represents it. Every thing runs therefore upon the favourable intentions of France, which is a very doubtful thing, for the reasons which the Author himself owns in this Article. What do that Truce and those particular Offers tend to, but to disunite some of the High Allies; and what will result from that disunion but such a Peace as she will be pleased to dictate?

We must not fancy that France makes particular Offers only to the United Provinces; she knocks at every door; she has her Emissaries every where to open them; there are no Promises or Bribes but what she makes use of to seduce some of the High Allies; which being so, what wou'd she not do under pretence of a Truce, whereby she might have a free entrance every where? But if the continuation of the War is so necessary to the High Allies to preserve their Union, upon which the success of their intention does altogether depend, why should France go to make 'em leave their strong Hold, and reduce 'em to that weakness, which has always been so pernicious to them? This we are taught by that Prudence, which requires that we should mistrust, in general, the Offers of an Enemy, and especially of an Enemy, who has so often surprised them with the like Artifices: To talk of Peace in the midst of a War, and to make War in the midst of a Peace; to suggest a Truce, or a Congress, in order to put ones self in a capacity of dividing Enemies by particular Offers, and thence to force the most obstinate to disadvantageous Treaties, is the Game of France: But it has proved so dismal to the High Allies, that they will not be deceiv'd by it in this juncture.

E e. That is to say, if notwithstanding the raising of the Siege of Gibraltar, the Spaniards remain faithful to the Duke of Anjou, the High Allies must no longer think of dethroning him; upon this supposition, that it is an impossible project. That Counsel, tho it may be very well suspected, as coming from an Enemy, might be admitted, if the Right of the House of Austria depended upon the good or perable

24 MEMORIAL.

perable difficulties they would meet with, in order to establish a Competitor, and secure to him the peaceable possession of all the Spanish Monarchy.

admits, that Right may be measured by Power: A Principle, which the Neighbours of France have but too much experimented; but we must not be discouraged, we shall see in the second part of the Memorial a Project, which shews the sincerity of the favourable intentions of France for a general Peace.

F. And therefore it may be the Allies will abandon that project, to apply themselves to a more certain and shorter one, wherein they wou'd find an entire safety, and greater advantages still than those which they proposed to themselves, and for Europe in general, as I shall shew evidently. Upon that principle their glory wou'd but increase, being then joined with their true Interests. This is what I shall prove demonstratively in the second part of this Memorial, when I have finished the first Draught of the means which might lead to a speedy and happy general Peace: This I shall do by building the project thereof upon this Foundation, that there ought to be very good and practicable Expedients, whereby the High Allies, and even the Neutral Powers, may be secured from the dangers which they fear for the time to come. And that his most Christian Majesty will facilitate the effect thereof for the general Good of Europe, and the particular advantage which wou'd accrue to France, if she was no longer the object of the jealousies and fears of her Neighbours.

G. With this Reserve it does not appear that there shou'd be any danger, if a young Prince, who is very much beloved by his Subjects, and the nearest in Blood to the late King, after the voluntary Cession which was

ANSWER.

ill disposition of the Spaniards: But that Right is grounded upon so solid a foundation, that it will engage all the Allies to support it.

The French Jurisprudence only

F. There is no need of any first Draught to build a project, that may answer the pretended intention of the Author: The conditions of the proposed Treaties begin and end all the Negotiations. But we are very far from our Reckoning: The Treaty of Partition will come again upon the Stage, with this difference, that the Lots are changed, and that the Lot of France appears under the name of the Duke of Anjou, to remove somewhat at the fears of the Allies. 'Tis pity that the most Christian King, who exercises so absolute a Sovereignty over all the Monarchy, since the intrusion of his Grandson, has so soon discovered that Lure, for a great many people might have been deceived by it: A great deal has been written against the pretended Partition, and a great deal might be written still against it, supposing such a change of Lots. But all Europe do but too much know the design of it; and therefore 'tis to no purpose for the Author to turn it several ways over and over again; 'tis not likely that the High Allies will hearken to it.

G. 'Tis much that the Author says nothing of the pretended Right acquired by the extorted or supposititious last Will of the late Catholick King; but it may be a Re-

made

made to him by his Father and Grandfather, shou'd remain in possession of Spain and the Indies which depend upon it, and abandon all the other States of that Crown, for the satisfaction of the Emperor, and the security of the United Provinces, which are the Bulwark of Europe.

himself or his Descendants. That Contract and that Renunciation ought to be of the same force and vigour with the Treaty of Peace of the Pyrenees, Article 33. as being the principal and most worthy part of it, and the most precious Pledge of the certainty of its duration. Seeing therefore the Treaties of Aix la Chapelle, Ni-meguen and Reswick suppose in express terms the Treaty of the Pyrenees as their Foundation, and the House of Austria has yielded nothing of her Right, it is certain that it is still in force, and that nothing could be done to her prejudice without her Knowledge and Consent. That the Duke of Anjou is well beloved by his Subjects, is nothing to the Case, and it remains still to be proved that he is the nearest in Blood to the late King.

That Proximity of Blood was to be found, in all respects, in the late Emperor, in respect to Succession. 1. Upon account of Agnation, as being issued in a direct Line from Philip of Austria, the first King of Castille of that name, to whose Children, and of Queen Joan his Wife, Ferdinand the Catholick King of Arragon, and Isabella Queen of Castille, Father and Mother of Joan, left their States united after their death in the form of a Monarchy. But it is certain that Agnation does always suppose the best Blood, and that as such it is privileged in the Successions of Kingdoms and Principal Fiefs by all Divine and Humane Laws, when there is competition of a Foreign Family. 2. Upon account of Cognition, as being Uncle of the late King, born of the Royal House by his Mother's as well as his Father's side, and besides allied to the late King by several other degrees of Consanguinity, which no Prince of the House of Bourbon can shew: For, as for the Dauphin of France, who pretends to derive his Right from Mary Therza his Mother, it is certain, that the Cognition she gives him with the late King, is only by the Father's side; seeing the Mother of that Queen was a Daughter of France, and consequently of a Foreign House; whereas the Cognition of the Emperor with the late King was twofold, the latter as Son of the Emperor's Sister, and the Emperor as Son of the Daughter of Philip IV. the late King's Father, not to mention so many other degrees of Consanguinity that are more remote, seeing it is a notorious thing, that the Blood of that most August House never ceased to circulate from one of the Branches into the other, since their separation.

If we add to all those Prerogatives the solemn Renunciation of the two last Queens of France, which doe altogether extinguish the Right of their Descendants, the Law established in consequence of the first, which was that of Queen Anne, whereby every Son or Daughter of France that should be born of that Marriage, is excluded from the Succession, and the Testamentary dispositions of King Philip III. and King Philip IV. in performance of those Renunciations and of the Law, and as having had the faculty of disposing amongst their Descendants, I don't know what shadow of Right the Most Christian King can have, to dispute that of the Emperor, and consequently of King Charles III.

Hh. But let us suppose for one moment, that this project is impracticable, and that the reputation and general interest of the High Allies, and their engagements do not permit them to consent, that the Throne of Spain should be possesst by a Prince of the House of France, who would be able in

serve, to insist upon it another time. The voluntary Cession of the Father and Grandfather gives no more Right to the Grandson than they had: The most Christian King by stipulating and accepting the Renunciation of the late Queen of France by his Contract of Marriage, reserved none for

Hh. All the Verbosity of this Article comes only to this, that the Treaty of Partition, or something equivalent must be brought in again, to engage the House of France to give up voluntarily her pretensions to the Spanish Monarchy, because otherwise

time to make use of the Forces of that great Monarchy in order to retake what he would yield in this Conjunction, and lastly, that they cannot depart from their design of settling the Arch-Duke in his place, after they have acknowledged him King of Spain, under the name of Charles III. Too their efforts in this Campaign were altogether favoured by Fortune, and even so as to be able to put their project in a full execution, it were necessary in such a case, even for the general interest of Europe, and to prevent the origin of a new War, which otherwise would infallibly happen hereafter, to return to the Treaty of Partition, or to something equivalent, to engage the House of France to abandon voluntarily her pretensions to the Spanish Monarchy; without which it is evident that the Peace, which shall be made can not last long.

Master of it, under the name of his Grandson, and under pretence of a forced or supposititious Will, is it not a mere illusion to go about to assure the Allies that the Peace, which he proposes upon a new Renunciation, will be more solid and lasting, than that solemn Treaty, and the three following have been?

I i. They who are full of this Notion, that there can be no true security for the time to come, unless France be brought low, cannot relish such a proposal; seeing they are not only for taking away the Crown of Spain from King Philip V. but they would likewise strip France of all the Conquests she made in this King's Reign.

Ties of Munster and of the Pyrenees, they may be overlook'd under that Title; but if they comprehend all those which she made since, they cannot be overlooked, seeing the Acquisitions by way of Conquest, ought necessarily to suppose a just War.

K k. And they pretend besides, that it is the Interest of England and Holland to weaken her Navy, to free themselves from the vast charges they would continually be at, in order to secure their Trade, and the Colonies which they have in America, supposing that the augmentation of the Naval Forces of France may endanger both of them.

K k. The Maritime Powers are so much concerned to give France no occasion to strengthen or increase her Navy, that the ruin of theirs must infallibly result from thence. They have seen with Amazement, that France has been able to contend with them for the Empire of the Sea the two last Wars, though they were seconded by the Sea Forces of the Spanish Crown, and having all the Ports thereof at their disposal. They have seen as I said already, France as formidable by Sea as by Land, preserve her Commerce in the Mediterranean with more ease than they could preserve theirs, and to take as many or more Ships from them, than they could take from her; so that of this increase of Power which must happen from her having the one or the other share of the Spanish Monarchy, does raise her Maritime Power in proportion, we see not how the just diffidence mentioned by the Author can be taken away, which still shews the necessity of providing against it, by restoring the Ballance.

the same pretensions would occasion a new War. It may be said in answer to it, that if the King of France has been willing to revive some pretensions to that Monarchy, after he had renounced them, alledging that he cou'd not do it; and if, without expecting that the Succession should be open, that is, seven years after the Renunciation, and after the Treaty concluded, sworn and ratified under that condition, he invaded the Spanish Netherlands under pretence of a Right of Devolution, which was altogether foreign to the Case, and had been expressly derogated in the Renunciation; lastly, if that Monarch cou'd not be restrained, neither by those Titles, nor any other consideration, from undermining that Monarchy all manner of ways, till he made himself Master of it, under the name of his Grandson, and under pretence of a forced or supposititious Will, is it not a mere illusion to go about to assure the Allies that the Peace, which he proposes upon a new Renunciation, will be more solid and lasting, than that solemn Treaty, and the three following have been?

I i. That Notion is so just and so generally established, that it cannot be destroyed but by the Restoration of the Ballance, such as I have represented it, and which falls very short of the depression of France, as I have shewn. As for the Acquisitions of the Crown, if they go no farther than those, which she made by the Treas-

ties of Munster and of the Pyrenees, they may be overlook'd under that Title; but if they comprehend all those which she made since, they cannot be overlooked, seeing the Acquisitions by way of Conquest, ought necessarily to suppose a just War.

K k. The Maritime Powers are so much concerned to give France no occasion to strengthen or increase her Navy, that the ruin of theirs must infallibly result from thence. They have seen with Amazement, that France has been able to contend with them for the Empire of the Sea the two last Wars, though they were seconded by the Sea Forces of the Spanish Crown, and having all the Ports thereof at their disposal. They have seen as I said already, France as formidable by Sea as by Land, preserve her Commerce in the Mediterranean with more ease than they could preserve theirs, and to take as many or more Ships from them, than they could take from her; so that of this increase of Power which must happen from her having the one or the other share of the Spanish Monarchy, does raise her Maritime Power in proportion, we see not how the just diffidence mentioned by the Author can be taken away, which still shews the necessity of providing against it, by restoring the Ballance.

A. But the Excessive Prejudices of those Men, which make them apprehend so many things for the time to come, binder them to consider,

stitution of her Government, and the many Ways she has to fill her Treasury, and restore her Commerce again in a little time, she will recover her self sooner than any of them, as appear'd in all the preceding Wars, wherein, tho' her Armies by Sea and Land were equal to those of all the Allies together, she was notwithstanding able to bear the Expence of it longer than they, to Exhaust them, and by that Means to force them to a disadvantageous and too hasty Peace.

B. That the Court of France must be necessarily oblig'd to make a very great Reform, in the Ordinary Expences of her Marine, because of the ill Condition of her Finances, and the great decay of her Manufactures and Foreign Commerce, which is the true Source of it, and which she cannot remedy but by Time, by an uninterrupted Peace, and by the singular Application of those who are entrusted with the Affairs of the Commerce of that Kingdom, and with their Finances, which will oblige her necessarily, after the Peace, to make a great Reform in her Naval Expence.

Reform then will only be made use of to raise her Commerce, and to extend it in all the Places she has lately seiz'd; and thus she will Employ all the Industry of her People. We cannot perceive then, how France will be weaken'd by it, but on the contrary, this Interval of Peace, with such an Increase of Dominions, must needs make France more Formidable by Sea, as the High Allies have always found at each Rupture.

A. We agree that France must be much exhausted by this War, and it is an Inconvenience common to her, with the High Allies; but it must also be granted, that according to the Con-

B. It is also agreed that France will Reform her Marine, but that must be understood of her Fleets only, because she will have no more need of them to Support her Commerce. Her Men of War will be Disarm'd, but what then, will she burn them? or will she give over building new ones constantly in all her Harbours? Her Mariners swarm on all sides, will they leave their Country to go and seek Employment elsewhere? Dare they, or can they do it? Their Names, their Age, their Place of Abode, are they not set down and mark'd by Classes in their Marine Registers? This

C. It will be the same as to the Land Troops, they will speedily be reduc'd to a moderate Number, when she has Disbanded her Militia and New Levies, and dismiss'd the Officers and Soldiers who demand Leave, as is usually practis'd on such Occasions.

to Subdue ? The more Dominions she acquires, the more easie it will be for her to subist her Troops ; and if Maintaining them for two or three Years, until her Enemies be Disarm'd or Disunited, incommode her a little, will she not be able to Reimburse her self a hundred fold on the first Rupture ? It's true she may Disband her Militia and New Levies, but as to the former, don't they continue Enregister'd by Name and Habitation in each Province, so as they may be rais'd again on the first notice ? And for the New Levies in this War, they have been so accustom'd to Licensiousness and Rapine, that that's enough to bring them together again when ever they are call'd ; so that it's plain, this Author designs only to amuse us with vain Illusions.

D. France will the more readily do so on this Occasion, because it is her Interest effectually to remove the Terror and Mistrust of her Neighbours, from whom she has nothing to fear so long as she keeps Peace, and gives them no cause to re-unite in order to Defend themselves against her Designs.

pagne, and reduce the United Provinces to Extremity ? Nay, which is more, had she not the dexterity to turn this League to her own Advantage, by stirring up the King of England against those Provinces, which perfectly turn'd the Balance on the fide of France ? What other Motive was there for the two preceding Leagues but the same Fear and Jealousie, yet did she forbear to renew her Invasions ? And did she not always come off with great Advantage ? In a Word, we see what we are come to af-

C. It is the same as to the pretended Reform of their Land Forces : Can France reduce them so Low as to give no Occasion of Umbrage to the High Allies ? Can she do thus without exposing the Bowels of the Kingdom to avow'd and open Robbery ? Or will she do it as long as she has any Neighbours

D. France has always had the same Interest, since her Invading the Netherlands in 1677. The Terror of her Power did then give Birth to the Triple League, which we had reason to think would have been a Barrier capable of setting Bounds to her Ambition : But what came of it, did she not break that Barrier in one Cam-

ter

ter four Peaces, she needs no more but a fifth to assure her self of the Universal Monarchy at the first Rupture.

E. *The History of her Monarch being full of Illustrious and Glorious Events, and that Great Prince being advanc'd in Years, we may naturally presume, that his Wisdom will make him avoid all Occasions of entring into a New War; and that after having brought this to a happy Determination very Advantagious to France,*

Power. King *Lewis XIII.* was of a weak Constitution, and lov'd Peace and Quiet, as every body knows, yet an able Minister, in whom he had Confidence, supplied all his Defects, made him cross the *Alps* in the middle of Winter, undertake the most dangerous Sieges, and assist at them in Person, and run from one end of the Kingdom to the other, as often as his Presence was necessary. In short, what has the present King done of his own accord, that the King his Father did not do by the Instigation of his Minister? And what have we not to fear from his two Grandsons, one upon the Throne of *France*, and the other upon the Throne of *Spain*, their Interests being so united, the Communication betwixt them so easie, and their Dominions so far extended? The French who are naturally petulant, and who place all their Hopes in War, will they suffer them to grow Effeminate and Idle? Will they not continually be preaching up to them the famous Examples of their Grandfather, and that false Glory which they make to confisit in Ravages and Invasions? Or if they give no Ear to those Sollicitations, mayn't there rise up another Admiral *Colligny*, to tell both of them, in the Name of the Nation, to make War upon some body or other, or that he will make War upon them, because he must have a War?

F. *And at the same time favourable to the Common Interest of Europe, he will reckon it his Glory to cultivate and maintain this happy Peace, for the Good*

E. *The advanc'd Age of the Most Christian King, might serve to give Credit to this Illusion, That he would spend the rest of his Days in Peace, if the present Constitution of the French Government were to cease with himself. France has for almost an Age been in such a posture, that the Person of the Sovereign neither adds to nor diminishes from her*

F. *But han't we need of better Guarantees than our Author, that France will reckon it her Glory to maintain this happy Peace? Had not she the*

same Motive in all the former Peaces? Or did she ever make Peace without a Sacrifice to her Ambition, or promising as much then as she can promise now? Let's suppose then, that there be yielded to her in this Peace, one or t'other of the two Lotts, mark'd out by the Treaty of Partition: Who will be Guarantee, that as soon as the High Allies are Disarm'd or Disunited, that *France* shall not fall upon that Lott which is assign'd for Satisfaction to the House of *Austria*? But let's suppose further, That the Motives alledg'd in this Memorial may for some time suspend this Rupture, who will be Guarantee that the Interval of this Peace shall not produce new Tricks, secretly to consume and perplex all the Neighbouring States, and do them as much Mischief as a vigorous War? To argue from what has been in Time past, to what may be in Time to come, has always been accounted a just Way of Reasoning, when there's a Concurrence of the same Causes and Dispositions.

G. *When it shall appear that Peace may be made, with the requisite Security, we are not to doubt but each Member of the League will be for hastening it to a Conclusion.*

G. There's no doubt but each Member of the League will be for hastening the Peace to a Conclusion, as soon as they can see the requisite Security; but that Security is the thing we want, and can't tell where

to find. To seek for it in a Course of Treating or Negotiation, is what the Prudence of the High Allies, confirm'd by their own Experience, ought to make them avoid. Did not *France* take the same Methods, to perswade them to Treaties in the preceding Wars? And was it not by the same Measures that she always broke off one or other of the Allies, seducing them by particular Offers? And was it not by the same Way that they always gain'd the Superiority in the Field, and by consequence the Advantage in all Treaties? It has been said before, and can't be too often repeated. The Preliminaries of the Peace to come ought to contain the requisite Security, and to put the Allies out of all danger of Surprize, which can't be done but by restoring things to the same state they were in by the two Treaties so frequently mentioned.

H. Her Majesty of Great Britain, in particular, will acquire no less Glory than Satisfaction in such a Treaty, by arriving happily at the End she propos'd in beginning this War; and it must be the same with the States-General of the United Provinces, who have thereby equally demonstrated their own Steadiness, and the Power of their Republick.

pendance and Peace of the two Nations.

I. The King of Prussia, the Elector Palatine and other Electors, with the Duke of Wirtemberg and other German Princes, who have deserv'd well of the Common-cause, may herein find their particular Advantages, besides those that must result from this Peace to the Generality of Europe, and particularly for the Security of the Empire, which it will solidly establish.

Author has his own Views in setting on Foot so often, and in so many Places, especially in the Empire, separate and insnaring Interests.

K. If it be true that France has form'd a Design, to oblige Spain to part with her Dominions in Italy, and the Spanish Provinces of the Netherlands, in that Case it can be no Prejudice to the two Crowns, to facilitate to his Royal Highness of Savoy the speedy Possession of the Dominions which were stipulated by a Treaty with the Empe-

H. The Glory and Satisfaction, which must redound to her Majesty of Great Britain and the States-General, depends only on their happy Success, in obtaining the Design of their taking Arms, which is to restore the Ballance that all Europe knows to be so necessary, and without which there's no particular Satisfaction to be hop'd for, to their People, for the Safety of their Commerce, or for the Independence of the two Nations.

I. It must be the same as to the particular Advantages, with which France would entice those Electors and Princes. The Matter in Hand is the general Interest of the Empire, which ought to comprehend and assure theirs; and this general Interest can never be secur'd, but by settling such a Frontier, as puts the Inner Parts of the Empire under Covert against the Insults of France: But the

K. We have seen already that the Author, by all he has advanc'd upon the Partition of the Spanish Dominions, and upon the Change of the Lott under the Conditional Particle if, would engage for nothing; and we perceive here, that if he return to the Charge, it is under the same Restrictions, If it be true. From whence we

for,

ror, under Guarantie, of the Q. of England and the States-General, considering, that by this means, that valiant Prince should have no other Interest, but that of the general Peace, and to wish that it might be speedily concluded.

L. It would be the same as to the Powers above nam'd, and then the War must speedily come to an End, like a Fire which has no more combustible Matter to entertain it. It is so burdensome in general, that it ought to be wish'd for passionately, and that Slaughter should cease.

will never want combustible Matter, so long as France has Neighbours. All combustible Matter ought as well to have ceas'd at the Conclusion of each of the Preceding Treaties, yet the Ambition of France always found out such Matter: But if this War be so burdensome in general, and occasion so much Bloodshed, to what ought those Calamities to be imputed, but to that same Ambition, which, for above 50 Years, has occasion'd continual Ruptures and Invasions.

M. Since the Emperor is to reap the greatest Advantages of the Peace, it is not to be presum'd, that his Imperial Majesty will be averse to it, especially if he find his principal Allies dispos'd to it, if the Empire find sufficient Security, and if his own House receive a considerable Addition of Grandeur and Glory from it.

the present Constitution of its Government, which exposes it to so many intestine Divisions; witness the present Proceedings of the

may judge, that it's only a Bait cast in at Random, to see if the United Provinces will catch at it, and bring on a Treaty upon that Foot; but we must follow him, tho' it be only a Repetition of what he said formerly upon the pretended Change of Lott.

L. What signifies it here to repeat Satisfaction to the D. of Savoy, wherein France has nothing to do, no more than in that of the Electors and Princes of the Empire, since it ought to be comprehended in that general Interest just now mention'd? The present War may be finish'd, it's true, but there

M. It is an absurd and false Supposition, that the Emperor is to reap the greatest Advantage by this Peace, since 'tis propos'd, that he should thereby lose one half of his Inheritance; so that it is France who reaps all the Fruits of it, under the Duke of Anjou's Share. As to the Security of the Empire, it can't be effected but by restoring the Ballance, considering

the Elector of *Bavaria*, and the Situation of the Empire, which in so many Parts exposes it to Foreign Wars.

N. *The very Rumor, if it were well founded, of such a Step towards a Peace, would oblige the Hungarians to a Submission; for they must then entirely obey the Emperor's Will.*

the very time of Stipulation, by a Solemn Treaty not to assist them, she will give them Assurances underhand to the contrary? After what *France* did at the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, with Relation to *Portugal*, there's no relying upon the Faith of that Crown on such Occasions.

O. *By this Means the Emperor's Family would absolutely be assur'd, for ever, of the Possession of that Kingdom, as well as of Transilvania; and the Emperor would have it in his Power upon the first Occasion of a Rupture with the Turks, easily to re-take Belgrade, with all the Country under its Command, and at last to extend his Conquests upon the Port, as far as he shall judge it convenient for his Interest so to do.*

Partnership with his Enemies. And when he had none, by how many Ways did *France* kindle all the Combustible Matter that was found among his Neighbours, and also among his own Subjects, in order to raise him up Enemies? This is evident from the whole History of his Reign, as is known to all the World, and therefore it's needless to insist upon it.

As to the Advantages which the Emperor may reap from the first War against the *Turk*, who will assure us that *France* will not snatch the opportunity out of his Hands, as she did in the last War from the late Emperor, to the great Scandal of all *Christendom*? That pious Monarch was oblig'd to purchase Peace from *France*, to the end he might pursue that War with Success, and yielded to her, by a 20 Years Truce, the provisional Enjoyment of

N. This Rumour, how well grounded soever, will contribute nothing to the Submission of the Rebels of *Hungary*, so long as *France* can foment a Revolt there, as she does at present, and who knows, but in

O. The House of *Austria* will always have Cause to dread the Plots and Conspiracies of *France*, be the Times what they will, but much more if the Crown of *Spain*, or the Dominions of *Italy* must remain to the Duke of *Anjou*, either by *France*'s putting that House out of a Condition to succour her Allies, or by continuing to enrich her self with the House of *Austria*'s Spoils. The late Emperor, tho' of a peaceful Temper, always found *France* in

all

all that she had usurp'd from the Empire since the Treaty of *Nimeguen*; and the price of that Purchase was such, as every one knows ought to have satisfy'd the King of France's Ambition, had it not been unsatiable. What Honour and Merit did he not then pretend to at *Rome* and elsewhere, upon the account of this Truce, which, according to him, gave the Emperor an opportunity to continue his progres against the Infidels? But what came of it? No sooner was the taking of *Belgrade* known, but the King of France, without any regard to the Obligation of the Truce, or his fine Promises, fell at once upon *Philipsburgh*, and laid Waste the Provinces on this side the *Rhine*, as far as his Arms could reach, by the most bloody and barbarous Invasion that ever was; and thus our Author, by having constant recourse to the old Illusions of France, only revives such Ideas as turn to his own Confusion.

P. The indirect Advantages which a General Peace cannot fail of procuring to the Emperor, join'd to those important Ones which he may reap by the Treaty, will at once prevent all those Dangers which he has just Cause to fear from the Continuation of this War, wherein many unforeseen Accidents may happen to his Disadvantage. It seems to be the Interest of the Court of Vienna, not to lose this very favourable Occasion to finish this War to her own Advantage.

Experience has taught them sufficiently how little stress there is to be laid upon the most plausible Appearances, and the Difficulties she has hitherto met with to find Money for carrying on the present War, which must needs Increase very much afterwards, by the Exhausting of her Treasury, and the Damage suffer'd by her Hereditary Countries.

P. The indirect Advantages may well happen to be unforeseen, but not the Incidents that may arise from the Continuation of the War. The Emperor is but too well inform'd of all the Intrigues of France at the Port, in the Northern Courts, and in the Empire it self, to raise up new Enemies against him; and as to the Exhausting of his Finances, there is little probability that the Peace will help that, if France succeed in Engaging the Emperor in a New War, with which she threatens him already under those unforeseen Accidents, and that very plainly in the following Article.

Q. Tho'

Q. Tho' those Considerations be very weighty, yet this is not all that ought to Engage the Court of Vienna to desire Peace. It's certain that they can't arrive to too high a degree of Prosperity, without giving Cause of Jealousie to divers Sovereigns, who will think they have less Reason to apprehend Danger from France. Thus the Court of Vienna, to ascertain their Success, and be less subject to Envy, may perhaps satisfy themselves with moderate and equitable Conditions, to procure a more speedy and solid Peace to Europe, which will equally discover their Wisdom and Prudence, and their Affection to the General Good of Christendom.

ought to put her out of a Condition to attempt any such thing speedily, by obliging her to keep within her Natural Bounds, there being no other way but this, as has often been said, to restore the Peace of Europe, and to assure the Independency of her Sovereigns: What he adds of the Court of Vienna, is a meer repetition that has been frequently answer'd.

R. If it should happen that in process of Time, every thing goes contrary to France, by such Revolutions as are usual enough in the World, and that by this means Affairs should take a Turn, according to the desire of the Confederate Powers; supposing also, that by their evident Superiority over France, the Spaniards, and all the People who depend on that Monarchy, should declare openly for the

Q. Those who understand the Circumstances of the Court of Vienna, know they can never arrive to too high a degree of Prosperity; the Empire and others are cur'd of those Fears, which France did formerly raise among them of the Power of the Emperors. Would to God they had as little reason to dread that of France, we should soon have a reasonable and durable Peace, and likewise an Universal Calm through all Christendom. Those Sovereigns whose Jealousie of the Emperor will revive, can be none but such whose Jealousie France her self will revive from a Motive of Ambition, by proposing new Leagues; and for this very Reason, the High Allies

R. For all our Author's dexterity to conceal his Design, he happens frequently to discover it without thinking on't. When he talks thus of the disposition of the Spaniards, and of all the People who depend on that Crown, to declare openly in Favour of the House of Austria, if they see the Confederates to be evidently Superior by Arms, it's perfectly to own the streight they are in, and how much it

House of Austria, this could never binder its being the Interest of the Allies to treat of a General Peace, on reasonable and moderate Conditions.

deceitful Treaty of Peace, he proposes now, a Truce or Treaty of Peace would give *France* an opportunity to lay those Humours which are now fermenting among the *Spaniards* and elsewhere, and to destroy the Party of the House of *Austria*; for when the People shall once hear of a Partition Project, and of the Change to be made in the two Lotts, uncertain under which Lott they may fall, it will be a good way to keep them Irresolute, and so to improve the Time, to confirm their own Dominion, and then we shall find them change their Stile, as soon as that is confirm'd. This Consideration alone is enough to convince us, that it is the Interest of *France*, and not of the Confederates he has in view, by proposing a Treaty for a General Peace in the present Conjunction, since it's directly contrary to the Interest of the Allies, because it exposes them to the danger of an abatement of their Zeal, or of a Division, by which if *France* obtain a Superiority of Arms, she will prescribe what Peace to them she pleases, as she did at the Treaty of *Nimeguen*.

S. Without improving their Prosperity too much, that there may be no Seeds of a New War left, and to avoid falling into such Inconveniencies as may be dangerous in the sequel.

dangerous; and in the second, it
Liberties of *Europe*; and this is what the Allies are left to chuse.

T. If we can establish a solid Peace in Europe by his most Christian Majesty's coming easifly into it, where's the Necessity of pushing Things on to the greatest Extremities of War?

in which his Ministers did not

concerns *France* to prevent that Superiority, to the end she may wreath the Yoke about that Peoples neck. This is the Design of the Truce he proposed at first, and failing that, of the

S. A New War, is according to our Author unavoidable, if France ben't left in possession of half the Spanish Monarchy, and it's the same if she be. In the first Case, the War will neither be so speedy nor dangerous; and in the second, it can't fail of being fatal to the Allies are left to chuse.

T. There was never yet any previous Conference of Peace, in which his most Christian Majesty did not talk of his making it easie, and never was there a Treaty in Consequence of those previous Conferences, discover a quite contrary Temper,

per when once they could come to sow Divisions. We must then take such a Method, as may warrant the general Interest of Europe against all Surprize; and this is not to be done, but by an Express and well founded Preliminary, as has been said already.

V. *And further, to bathe Europe in the most generous Blood of Christians, with the least part of which we might easily reduce the Infidels, and retake from them all that they possess in Christendom, considering their present Weakness: But since this last Reflexion is to very little Purpose,*

Christians to Chase those Infidels out of Europe, during the last War? But I shall forbear saying any thing further on this Head, because I would not revive the Indignation of all Christendom, but shall conclude with our Author, that this Reflexion is to very little Purpose.

U. *I shall content my self to say, That if the Consequences were not too ticklish, for France to offer an Alternative to the Allies, that is to say, either to return to the Treaty of Partition, made before the Death of the King of Spain, and even to cut off some part of it, to take away from the English those Causes of Fear, which they conceived thereupon; It is very probable that Court would have propos'd it to determine this present War, since that would be still more advantagious for France, than to abandon to the Archduke all the Spanish Dominions in Italy with the Spanish Netherlands, to be disposed of*

V. This Christian Reflexion would have been very seasonable at the first Rupture, made by France in 1667; for who is it that hath occasion'd Europe to be bath'd since in the generous Blood of Christians? Who is it that stirr'd up, and so powerfully sustain'd those Infidels against them? In a Word, who was it that hinder'd the Christians to Chase those Infidels out of Europe, during the last War?

U. I cannot conceive what those ticklish Consequences are, that should hinder France to offer to the Allies the Alternative of the two Shares of the first Treaty of Partition, and even to cut off some part of their Share, which gave Umbrage to England: For to say that it would have been more advantagious to France to have had her Share annexed to her Crown, is destroy'd by her arrogating to her self the absolute disposal of the whole Monarchy in the Name of the Duke of Anjou; and this Authority she would establish much more solidly by a Peace over such Share as should be allow'd her,

F 2 by

by the Allies, as they shall find
most suitable to their Interests.

W. It's of the highest Importance that this should be so, to form a perfect Security for the Republick of the United-Provinces, in which most part of Europe find themselves concern'd, since by her Situation & Strength, supported by a vast Trade, and by the Wisdom of her Government, she must always be the strongest Bulwark of the Liberty, and Independence of the Soveraigns of Christendom, and in this she is much more valuable than the ancient Republick of Rome, who setting no Bounds to her Grandeur, aim'd only at invading and oppressing her Neighbours, nay even the most remote Nations.

two Branches for three Reasons. The first is, That to counter-ballance the Power of France, an Hereditary and Monarchical Power is necessary, that they may be always in a Condition to act, because it's known, by long and fatal Experience, how easie it is for France to embroil all Repubicks, Elective Dominions, or any other, where the Royal Authority is more limited. The second is, that the same Power ought to extend to all the Places where France can attack her, and to have an Essential Interest every where to oppose the Growth of her Power. The third is, that this Faculty to act, and the Power which directs it, require a temperate Government, mix'd with Uprightness and Honesty, to ascertain by that means the Peace and Confidence of their Neighbours. Now those Conditions are not to be found altogether any where else but in the House of Austria so establish'd, as has been said, and with this Advantage more; that she can never give any Umbrage to her Neighbours, both because of the known Constitution of her Government; and because being exposed to many

besides the evident Superiority she would immediately have over the other, and which would no more be disputed with her.

W. It is not to be gain-said, that the Share, to which the Spanish Netherlands must fall, is of great Importance to the Safety of the Republick of the United-Provinces; but our Author will never be able to prove that this can be a sufficient and durable Security. The strong Bulwark of the Liberty and Independency of the Soveraigns of Christendom can be nothing but the restoring of such a Balance, as has been already mention'd.

There must be a Power in Europe to counter-ballance that of France, and this can be no where else, but in the House of Austria, fully establish'd in her

many Attacks by reason her Dominions are so much dispers'd, she is not able to maintain her self, but by their Assistance, and especially that of the Maritime Powers, for Reasons that are very well known.

Without this Balance well establish'd, it's a meer illusion that the *United Provinces* can always be the *most firm Bulwark*, &c. even tho' we suppose them in a constant Alliance with *England*, as to which I refer to the Reflections upon Article I shall only add, That if the Crown of *France* could hold out in the two last Wars, against those two Powers, tho' so formidable by Sea and Land, against the two Branches of the House of *Austria*, against the Empire and the rest of the High Allies; and if in those two dangerous Wars, she was able to preserve her Advantage, and came off oftener Victorious than otherwise, it's in vain for these Powers, nay for all the Allies together, to flatter themselves with being able to make Head against her, upon the first Rupture, after such an Encrease of Power, as she must needs have, by either Lott of the Partition, which is begun already to be verify'd in this War.

As to the privative Utility which is to redound to the *United Provinces* by a Peace, with this Barrier and advanc'd Wall, about which our Author makes so much noise, What profit can one imagine by it? If supposing that Republick to be more powerful than it is, she must always continue in Arms, which would infallibly ruin her People, and destroy her flourishing Trade, which is their chief Support. But it's in vain for this Author to be so prodigal of his Incense to this Republick, she understands her Interest too well to be surpriz'd by common Topicks of Praise, tho' he has not exceeded in that neither: I agree with him, that *she is more to be valued than the Old Republick of Rome*, and had he added that *she is more to be valued than France*, whose Ambition he has drawn to the Life, under that of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, I should not have quarrell'd with him.

X. *It cannot be doubted that England and Holland, united in a good Correspondence, make a Counterpoise sufficient to keep the Balance equal, betwixt the Houses of Bourbon and Austria.*

X. It is true, that the Union of the Maritime Powers will always Maintain the Balance, as mention'd above, and not otherwise. But who can promise that this Union, and good Understanding, will be of any long

long duration? For if *France* engaged them in a War together, and to weaken one another, when they should have maintain'd the Balance betwixt her and the House of *Austria*, how many Ways may she find to divide them, if once the Peace were concluded? But this I leave to the Consideration of those two Powers, who know better than I the distinct Interests and Combustible Matters, which *France* would find among them to Disunite them. But as for the rest, I willingly allow the Author all his Commendations upon the *United Provinces* and their Government; but does he not perceive, that to repeat them so often is to discover his Game? Small Birds may be caught by Piping, but not a whole Government, whose Penetration and Wisdom he himself owns.

Y. *It ought to be considered, that the House of Austria will advance her self much by a Peace, which will be Advantageous to her several Ways, and that France must needs continue Weak a long time, by the great Efforts she has made, which have alienated her Finances so much, that she can't recover it but by length of Time.*

Y. To what purpose are all those Repetitions? I must tell our Author once for all, that the Matter in hand is neither the Elevation of the House of *Austria*, nor the Depression of that of *France*; enough has been said on both those Subjects in the Course of this Answer: But that *France* should continue Weak a long time, by the Efforts she has made in this

War, is what Experience shews to be false, as has often been said. To which I shall only add, for avoiding Repetition, that she will need less time to recover her self than before, because she has nothing to do but to reduce the great Dominions which fall to her share by the Partition, under the Yoke of her Arbitrary Power, to augment her Forces and Revenues almost one half; after which, who can hinder her from breaking the Treaty according to Custom? It is quite otherwise with the House of *Austria*, who, according to the Constitution of her Government, considered in the whole of her Dominions, has not only nothing near the same Means as *France* to repair her Losses, as has been already said, but lies expos'd to as many Attacks as she has separate Countries that have no Communication with one another; and who knows but when she comes out of this War, *France* may Engage her in another infinitely more dangerous. We know well enough how she stands with the *Ottoman* Port, and the other Potentates that are her Neighbours. To return to the Maritime Powers:

Powers: Who must maintain the Balance? We know well enough, that according to the Constitution of their Government, they can neither continue Standing Armies, nor flatter themselves always to prevail with their People to undertake a War, when France thinks fit to renew one. It's irksome to be oblig'd to use so many Repetitions, but I must follow my Author.

Z. *It's true, that it would be no small Glory to the Most Christian King, to have his Grandson continue in the peaceable Possession of Spain and the Spanish Indies.*

the contrary Obligations, which his Most Christian Majesty voluntarily entred into, at his Contract of Marriage, to his own Solemn Oath, and to the Tenor of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, of which those Obligations, and that Contract, make up the noblest and most essential Part. He would, without doubt, have other Sentiments of this Matter, if the flattery of his Court had not surpriz'd his Conscience and Justice.

A a. *By the voluntary Consent of the Emperor, his Majesty of Great Britain, and the States-General of the United Provinces, and of all the other Sovereigns who Compose the Grand Alliance,*

Z. This pretended Glory is ever the Stile of that People, who think it consists in Ravages and Invasions: But as to the Intrusion of the Duke of Anjou, whether it be Glorious

to Support him in it, I refer to

A a. It is true, that the voluntary Consent of the late Emperor would have been very necessary to have given the Duke of Anjou a Right, and by consequence to have laid a Foundation, for that Glory which would have resulted to the

Most Christian King, to see his Grandson in the peaceable Possession of Spain and the Spanish Indies; but he could not have given that Consent even tho' he would, because the Crown of Spain is the Majorat of his Family, as it descends from King Philip of Austria, the first Acquirer, as was said already, and as the Kings Philip III. & IV. have declared it in their last Testaments, the former in Article 34. and the second in Article 65. Now if the Crown of Spain be the Majorat, or Entail of the Family, and likewise the Chief of all the Majorats of Spain, as the Spanish Authors agree; and if the Majorat is a Law of Succession in such sort, that the Estates remain intirely, and for ever in the Family, according to Molina, Lib. 1. de Fur. primogen. c. n. n. 22. and the Law 40. de Toro, what likelihood is there that the late Emperor either

would

would or could have given this Consent to the Prejudice of his Family? But let us suppose that he would have given his Consent, the two Princes, his Sons and their Descendants for ever, would they not always have had a Power of Revocation, since they derive their Right from the Family and Independant of all posterior Dispositions in their Prejudice, to which they would not have consented? They knew well enough, that if *Ferdinand I.* the youngest Son of *Philip I.* yielded his Right to the Emperor, *Charles V.* his eldest Brother, in the Treaty which they made at *Brussels*, *Anno 1522*. It was in Consideration of Primogeniture, *tanquam Primogenito*, and that without taking any notice of his Right, as he declares it in the Express Terms of that Treaty; and likewise that the Intention of all the Catholick Kings since *Philip I.* and the Dispositions each of them made, tended wholly to ascertain this Right to them; and the last King of *Spain* would have done the same, had not Violence been offer'd to him, or surpriz'd him by such Methods as all the World knows. The late Emperor, by disposing of his Right in Favour of King *Charles*, his second Son, has more consider'd the general Interest of *Europe*, than that of his own House; and since the high Allies desired this Disposition, it is their part to assist him, to whom he resign'd it to obtain his Right. The Violence and Tricks made use of in the Intrusion of the D. of *Anjou*, cannot give him a Right, nor add any thing to the Glory of the most Christian King. As to the Consent of the high Allies, we may easily judge by what went before, that these are only Words of Course; for as to what relates to their Guarantie, we know well enough, that if *France* once obtain her End, she will have no further need of it.

B b. In all likelihood they will never agree to this, but under good Precautions, and in particular, to bring England and Holland into it, Spain must necessarily part with something in America to those two Nations, that they shall think most convenient for them, to enlarge and favour the Colonies which they have there, and that *France* should concur in this for the reciprocal

B b. All Grants that the D. of *Anjou*, the pretended King of *Spain*, can make to the Maritime Powers in *America*, and all the Advantage with which he would favour their Commerce, must only be look'd upon as a Bait, to make them catch at the Hook. It is the same as to all the Precautions that can be taken to hinder *France* from meddling with the

Affu-

Assurance of Commerce, which it will also be her Interest to do. Besides, the French must never have any Privileges or Prerogatives in Spain, that are not common to the English and Dutch, nor must they meddle with the Government of Spain, or have French Troops there, according as the States-General propos'd before the Rupture in their Memorial of March 22. 1701. presented to the Count d'Avaux, Ambassador Extraordinary from the French King to their High Mightinesses.

us for their Honesty, after so many Instances of the contrary, as we have on the part of France, upon which the other must depend ?

Cc. There will be a Necessity to joyn to the Treaty of the General Peace, all the Securities propos'd in that same Memorial, to prevent Spain, or a part of the Dominions of that Crown, from being ever united or incorporated to that of France, under any pretext whatever. It's visible that the French will receive no effeual prejudice by granting those Articles, and others of that nature : On the contrary, they ought to look upon those things in France as advantagious, if they serve to confirm her Peace, and give Occasion to restore and augment her Riches, which will be infallible, if she take care to entertain a good and solid Correspondence with all her Neighbours.

Government of Spain, or sending French Troops thither, &c.

The Business is, that he may obtain his End, which is the Consent of the Emperor, and the peaceable possession of Spain and the Indies, under the Name of the Duke of Anjou. He will not need above three Years to break through all his Engagements, and Woe to them that dare contradict him after this Enlargement of Power, so that all must depend upon the Honesty of the two Crowns ; and if the Matter be so, what valuable Guarantee can they give

Cc. They may join to the General Treaty of Peace such precautions as they think fit, but no more of them will be kept than France pleases, as has been often said. Were not all possible precautions taken at the Treaty of the Pyrenees, to pull up by the Root all that could give a Handle for any Trick, by which that Crown could contraveen it ? And was not the like done in the three following Treaties ? Was there not in all of them a Sacrifice made to the King of France's Ambition, and care taken to cut off all Combustible Matter, to put a stop to that Fire which devour'd all that came near it ? But all those precautions served

G to

to no other purpose than to impose upon the Credulity of the Treaters, and those Sacrifices serv'd only to put *France* in a Condition for new Undertakings. This is the Sense in which the French take all the Expedients to be Advantagious, which the Most Christian King can think of, for bringing this War to a Conclusion, that he may by the Peace keep one or other of those Shares he pretends to, which will enable him in a very little time to make himself Master of the other. As to the rest, it is certainly true, that *France* may be secure from War, if she take care to entertain a good and solid Correspondence with all her Neighbours, which is the honestest thing our Author has said ; but he did not perhaps consider, that that's the very thing with which we have just Reason to upbraid that Crown. It is great pity then, that his Interest and his Maxims are so contrary to the entertaining that good and solid Correspondence, as his Neighbours have found at all times ; and 'tis yet more pity, that the Government of all those Powers that he has the greatest mind to Invade, are subject to be so much Disconcerted, and form'd meerly for the Defensive, otherwise it were easie to be under Covert against that Interest and those Maxims, and perhaps also to make *France* for once to taste the pleasure of Cultivating that good and solid Correspondence, in which all *Christendom* is so much concern'd.

D d. *It does not appear that the Interests of England, could be any obstacle in the Way of the Peace, since the Court of France being desirous to make Peace, and having a great Esteem for their August Queen, according to the Generous Disposition of the French, who are accustomed to praise and admire Virtue in their Enemies, will not refuse to grant all the reasonable Articles that can be demanded on the part of England.*

vour of the Emperor Charles V. the only Emperor of the House of Austria who could give Umbrage to his Neighbours. Now if the Power of France was capable of giving Umbrage to England,

D d. *As to the particular Interest of the Crown of England, all Europe knows well enough, that it consists in the restoring of a Balance, which is the only thing that can make her happy Abroad. King Henry VIII. made this Balance his Maxim, and maintain'd it, as has been already said, against France, at a time when she was not near so formidable as she is now become since the Treaties of Munster and the Pyrenees, and that too in fa-*

land, at a time when she was confin'd within her Natural Boundaries, how much more ought she to give them Umbrage at this time, considering the great Increase of her Power since, and yet still more, if she be left in possession of half the Spanish Monarchy? To this, if we add the infinite Advantages she has over all her Neighbouring Powers, as has been observ'd already, it is certain, that there's Cause enough not only to alarm the English Nation, but the remotest People of Europe. Matters being thus, it is very probable that the Crown of *England* will never agree to any Treaty, except the Restitution of the Balance, as above-mentioned, be the Preliminary Condition. 'Tis to this end, that the Incomparable Queen, who Wears it at this Day with so much Glory, directs all her Care, and the force of her Arms; so that if the French were as sincere as the rest of Europe, in admiring her Heroical Magnanimity, her Zeal for the Publick Welfare of Christendom, and her Wisdom truly Extraordinary, it were no more but her just Merit.

E e. In like manner, as to what concerns the States-General, it's probable that his Most Christian Majesty will take pleasure to favour their Security and Prosperity, since they must contribute indirectly to the Security and Prosperity of France, as was observ'd in the preceding Memorial.

arm'd, and without Foreign Assistance, if they durst make the least opposition to his Will. This needs no further Proof than the *ill Satisfaction* of the Manifesto of 1672, and the Tenor of the Memorial which was presented to them on the 4th of December 1699. so that it's needless to mention a multitude of other Proofs, which the States cannot have forgot. These are the Touchstones by which they are to try the Intrinsec Value of those good Words which the Most Christian King gives them here; the Honey that comes from that Quarter is never without a Sting.

F f. If by Effects of this Nature, which will be no less agreeable than advantagious for the Confederates, and Europe in general, we should see a happy Calm succeed an horrible Tempest, and the Uncertainties we are reduc'd to by this War; and if this should be owing principally to the Judicious Moderation of his Most Christian Majesty, and to that Tenderness he has always discover'd for his Subjects, which may probably Engage him to be extraordinary Easie in any thing that may procure them Relief, We should find the Animosities among the Parties to cease, and those violent Passions so frequently charged upon him by his Enemies, to change into others, that, with an Elogium, should do justice to the Personal Qualities of that Great and Illustrious Monarch.

G g. The Motives of Hatred, Interest and Jealousie, with the Prejudices that at present cloud Men's Minds, would be happily dispers'd, by means of a solid General Peace, carefully built upon durable Foundations, that might for a long time ascertain the Universal Peace of Christendom. Were Matters once brought to these Terms, no doubt we should speedily see a great Change in the reciprocal Interests of the Powers in War, and his Most Christian Majesty, by a Procedure so ge-

F f. Such Effects as those propos'd by our Author, will never produce that Good with which he would flatter the States General, especially if it must depend on the Judicious Moderation of his Most Christian Majesty, and the Tenderness he has for his Subjects. And as to the extraordinary Easiness, which that Moderation and Tenderness must produce, it's an old Trap by which it's impossible to catch any body. France always spoke the same Language when ever she had a Mind to bring on a Treaty of Peace, as has been said oftner than once. They must have recourse to new Artifices, that suit better with the End of this War, for this is an old Song which no body cares for.

G g. It is true that all those Motives would be happily dispers'd by means of a solid general Peace; but that solid general Peace, and durable Foundation, is the very thing we want, and can't tell where to find, but in the Restoration of that Balance; and if this be granted we will allow the Author all that he says, as to the great Change that will happen in the mutual Interests of all the Powers who are in War. As to the Praises which must result from it to the

numerous,

nerous, in Favour of the publick Welfare of Europe, would acquire no less Admirations and Love from all other People, than he does now from his own, as well as from such Strangers, who not being prepossessed with particular Passions, judge of his Actions and Conduct without Parti-
lity.

H h. The extraordinary Wisdom and Penetration of that Great King must needs satisfie him, that there is no Method more sure, and at the same time more Glorious, for him to rid himself of the Incumbrance of this War, and to bring it to a speedy Conclusion, than with a good Grace to favour his Enemies in any thing that will not be prejudicial to France, and to make the general good of Europe the principal end of the Peace. By this Method that wise Monarch will most surely establish his Glory to Posterity. He cannot be ignorant that the greatest Empires cannot last long, and that they usually fall under their own Weight.

but whether the Good of Europe, or his own Interest was his principal End, is pretty plain from the Sequel. If that wise Monarch would solidly establish his Glory to Posterity, and merit those Praises of all Europe which our Author bestows upon him here, he may do it by contenting himself with the Advantages he acquir'd by the Treaties of Munster and the Pyrenees, that were so advantagious to his Crown, and cast the Ballance on his side. By this means he may restore that happy Peace which all Europe ought to expect from his judicious Moderation, and may crown the History of his Life, by a saving and glorious Repen-
tance.

Most Christian King, they are useless Repetitions, Words in the Wind, and gross Illusions, which I cannot forbear to censure, because our Author builds so much upon them.

H h. We must fairly own, that it suits well with the extraordinary Penetration and Wisdom of the Most Christian King, to take that Method of favouring his Enemies with a good Grace in any thing that will not be prejudicial to France, and that there's no Method more sure to rid himself of the Incumbrance of this War, and to bring it to a speedy Conclusion. 'Tis the very Part that Monarch acted always in former Negotiations, to favour with a good Grace one or other of his Enemies in what was not prejudicial to his Crown, by that means to rid himself of all the Wars which he began, and brought them to a speedy Conclusion;

I i. From

I i. From whence we may infer, that if France had obtain'd the Victory over the Allies at Hochstet, that would have serv'd for no other End, but to engage her in an Abyss of Designs and Enterprizes one after another, that in the end must have been fatal to her, because they could not have fail'd to weaken the Inward Parts of the Realm in several Manners, which all the Splendor of external Glory that might have redounded to her from such a Victory, could not have balanc'd.

Moderation, Penetration, and extraordinary Wisdom of the King his Master, had no other Tendency but to surprize the Credulity of the States-General? and also, that if he have time given him to re-establish his Forces and Finances, under the Favour of such a Peace as he proposes, they will speedily see him engag'd in an Abyss of Successive Designs and Enterprizes, till he obtain the Universal Empire which he aims at. For weakning the inward Parts of his Kingdom, we cannot suppose it to be more weakened than it was at the end of the two last Wars: Nay, it must be a great deal less, because in this War France has made use of the Money and Forces of the Spanish Monarchy; and it will be so much the easier to repair her Strength, that the half of the Spanish Monarchy must doubly contribute to it. Thus our Author betrays his true Sentiments, by endeavouring to disguise them, or by speaking too much.

K k. So that it was not said without Ground, in the first Memorial, that the Interruption of the Success of his Most Christian Majestry's Arms on this Occasion, may turn to the Good of France. The Natural Moderation of her Monarch could not,

ANSWER.

I i. The Force of Truth does from time to time extort such Concessions from our Author, which confirm us more and more in our just Diffidence in the Natural Moderation, and advanc'd Age of the Most Christian King; for by confessing here, that if this wise Monarch had obtain'd the Victory at the Battle of Hochstet, That would only have serv'd to engage him in an Abyss of Designs and Successive Enterprizes. Is not this plainly to confess, that all he has said again and again of the advanc'd Age, of the Natural

K k. We know not what the Author may have said in his former Memorial, but it's absurd in this Article to charge upon the Genius of the French Nation, such an Idea of Conquest, as destroys that which he gave us of the Natural Moderation, perhaps,

perhaps, have binder'd, but that the Continuation of his Success, and the daring Genius of the Nation, should have push'd his Success further; so that there's Ground to presume, that the Court of France would scarce have been able to set Bounds to their Prospect of aggrandizing themselves, and by Consequence, could not have binder'd the Kingdom's being Dispeopled of her best Men, for Sustaining her Glory and Conquests, without speaking of the Money that must have constantly gone out, which could not have been compensated by all the pretended Advantage of her Commerce with Spain, especially the Loss of Men, which is inestimable.

we are to judge of this Natural Moderation of the Most Christian King, and of the daring Temper of the French Nation, and for the Consequences he draws from them; they are, if we may be allow'd to say so, Stories fit only to lull Infants asleep, instead of Reasons to be offer'd to Persons so prudent and wise as the States General.

L1. These Consequences being naturally deduc'd, are strong enough to oblige that Crown to abandon the Hopes she flatter'd her self with, since there's no appearance of their Success, and that the Success it self would be ruinous to them, and she will be so much the more induc'd to this by the present Posture of her Affairs, when

and advanc'd Age of their Monarch. But allowing this Supposition to be true, what can we conclude from it? But that under a King advanc'd in Years, such as their present Monarch, or under another who may be weak and of a peaceable Temper, as it's probable the next Successor may be, there will always be the same Danger from the daring Genius of the Nation. Thus he destroys, in a few Words, all the Idea he would have impos'd upon us for ascertaining the Peace upon so many Airy Reasons, which are directly contrary to what we know, and what we have so often experienc'd of the Interests and Maxims of France. The rest of the Article tends only to confirm what

L1. These natural Consequences, which result from the former Article, are indeed weighty enough to oblige France to suspend for a time, her hopes of enjoying the whole Spanish Monarchy. But it's enough for her, as has been said again and again, to preserve the half of it, and to gain time to seize the other half at her

spē

she sees that her Measures to Reduce the Duke of Savoy, and to force him to take part with the two Crowns, have not had the promised Effects, that she has been forc'd to raise the Siege of Gibraltar, and that after such a prodigious Expence of Blood and Treasure, things are become more Uncertain, and less Advantagious for France, than they were at the beginning of the War. She sees also, that how great and extraordinary soever her Efforts have been, to have a Fleet this Year at Sea, Equal or Superior to that of the Allies in the Mediterranean, that it will be very difficult for her to Attain to it, or at least to reap an Advantage from it, proportionable to the Care and excessive Expences that she must be at upon this Account.

M m. The Court of France is not certain, that the Measures she has taken to hinder the Imperialists from entring the Milaneze and the Mantuan, will have all the Success she expels, no more than her precautions to render the Designs of the Allies upon the Moselle, in the Netherlands, and upon the Rhine or elsewhere abortive. We have reason also to doubt, whether their Measures to prevent what may happen in Spain be not more uncertain. In the mean time it is certain, that any considerable Check on what side soever, may have very ill Consequences, and that a Battle gain'd by France will not Decide the Matter in her favour. But supposing, that the Providence of that Court render all the Efforts of the

Conveniency. The bad Success of her Undertakings, as our Author relates them here, shews plainly enough the Trick that is couch'd under this en-snaring Proposal.

M m. From the Considerations of the Campagne that is past, our Author comes to those of the present, and proves nothing at all, but what the Allies know too well; that is to say, that it concerns France to put off the Match now it's become too strong for her. But the same Considerations, let the Allies see how much it behoves them to press by the Continuation of the War, the restoring that Balance in which every one may find their Security, and not to let slip such an Occasion as perhaps they may never have again. They have found that France, with her own Forces, has been equal to, or rather has surpass'd all theirs together. They perceive she would make use of the propos'd Cessation, to Dis-
Enemy,

Enemy, during this Campagne, of no Effect, must she not be oblig'd to provide new Funds and new Levies for the next?

always in Action, and ever ready to take Advantage of their Divisions; and that the Increase of Power which will happen to her by the Lott she aspires to, can't fail of giving her such a Superiority by Land and Sea, that it will be impossible for them to resist her upon the first Rupture. So that if it be true that France begins to decline in her Superiority, as our Author endeavours to prove, tho' there's little appearance of it hitherto, it is their business to improve the Opportunity, and to oblige her to such a Peace, as shall lay her under a Necessity to observe the Conditions of it, which cannot be but on the Foot so often repeated, since there is no relying upon her Treaties or Honesty.

No. Politicians will say, that in this Case the Confederates will be under the same Necessity, I own it; but we ought to consider, that the Inconveniences and Loss which may result to them from it, will be no Ease to the Subjects of the King, who are already very much exhausted: There's a great deal risqu'd, by offering to exact more of them than they are able to bear. Besides, the greater the Military Preparations, the greater the Difficulty will be to restore the Home and Foreign Commerce of the Kingdom, which must needs occasion a long and notable diminution in the ordinary Revenues of France. This is what her Wise Council will think themselves oblig'd to prevent by a Speedy and Solid Peace, which depends

arm and Disunite them, or to engage them in other Wars, that they may have no Relaxation while she alone enjoys it; and being always in Arms, always in Action, and ever ready to take Advantage of their Divisions; and that the Increase of Power which will happen to her by the Lott she aspires to, can't fail of giving her such a Superiority by Land and Sea, that it will be impossible for them to resist her upon the first Rupture. So that if it be true that France begins to decline in her Superiority, as our Author endeavours to prove, tho' there's little appearance of it hitherto, it is their business to improve the Opportunity, and to oblige her to such a Peace, as shall lay her under a Necessity to observe the Conditions of it, which cannot be but on the Foot so often repeated, since there is no relying upon her Treaties or Honesty.

No. These suppos'd Politicians say true, that the Allies must suffer no less than France, by their Efforts to resist her. The difference lies in the Object: The Confederates are forc'd to it in their own Defence, to Ascertain their Independence and Liberty, whereas that Crown has nothing in View but to Aggrandize herself, by the Oppression of a Family, who had they always been well seconded, might have serv'd for a Bulwark against all her Invasions. As to the People of France, it is too true that they groan under the Burden of the War, and with so much the more reason, that it's the fault of their own Monarch alone that they are not eas'd of it. We may add, to confirm this, that

H. chiefly

chiefly, as has been said, in the Easiness of the Terms which the Wisdom and Generosity of that Prince invites him to, in order to Ascertain the Happiness and General Peace of Christendom.

To give an entire Idea of the Plan of the Peace, and in order to draw up one that is just and regular, We must be oblig'd to add a large Continuation to this 4th Memorial, in which we shall insert very important Things to give Light to this Matter, which is only rough drawn here; and we shall afterwards add particular Memorials upon Commerce, that will be no less useful to contribute to a General Peace.

Continuation, and the Light he promises to give us in these Matters of which we stand in no need. The Plan of the Peace is form'd already by the two Treaties so frequently mention'd, there's nothing to do but to Restore every one their Own, and that France oblige her self to this by Way of Preliminary, without any other Negotiation. But our Author has his own Views in his rough Draught, 1. To turn and toss in several Manners the Partitions that are to be made of the Spanish Monarchy by the Conditional particle *if*. He was willing to see, without engaging himself, whether this diversity of Repartitions would not revive some separate Interest among the Allies, of which the King his Master might make his Advantage. 2. By Supporting the possession of one of those Lotts, by the Sovereignty of the Duke of Anjou, he thought to remove the Umbrage which would result, from seeing Spain incorporated with the Crown of France, tho' it be the same thing at bottom; and at the same time, to put this Increase of her Power under Cover, as a Preliminary agreed upon. 3. By referring the true Plan

all the Wars he has undertaken these 40 Years, to rise to his present Grandeur, have only serv'd to make his People more Miserable; and the more he has enlarg'd his Conquests Abroad, the more he has Oppress'd his People at Home, by establishing that Arbitrary Power which overwhelms them. So that it's no less the Interest of his own Subjects, than that of the Confederates, to have him reduc'd to such a Condition as may make him incapable of attempting any thing further.

Our Author might have sav'd himself the needless trouble of such an imperfect rough Draught, and may also save himself the Labour of his large

Plan of the Peace to come to the future Insights he will give us, his Design is to gain Time, to see the Issue of this Campaigne. We may then lay our Account with it, that if the Most Christian King don't recover the Superiority of Arms which he lost last Campaigne, he will afterwards re-touch the Lines of the Plan, of which he has now given us only a rough Draught: But if his Master be so happy as to regain the Superiority, then the Continuation will be of the same Stile with the Memorial that was presented to the States-General in the Name of that Monarch in 1699. that's to say, That his Most Christian Majesty might have made all those Advances towards a Peace, in a Time when the Success of the War was doubtful, but that the Face of Affairs being so much alter'd by the Success of his Arms, it were to destroy his good Intentions for Peace, to tye himself to the Terms then propos'd; and that they may not provoke his Pacifick Intentions, they ought to put themselves in a Condition to merit by their good Conduit, (by which must be understood a speedy Submission to his Will) *the Honour of his Affection, and the Continuation of the Marks of his Good-will.*

F I N I S.

